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CHILDREN'S RIGHTS v. PARENTS' RIGHTS: A
PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE CUSTODIAL
RELOCATION CONUNDRUM
JANET LEACH RICHARDS*
INTRODUCTION
Being the pawn in a contested custody battle between two warring parents is
traumatic for a child. The likelihood that the child will suffer some emotional injury
increases when the child is forced to endure a second contested custody battle
because one parent decides to relocate outside the jurisdiction of the court that
granted the divorce. This paper suggests an approach that minimizes the adverse
consequences of relocation. The approach still keeps the best interests of the
children paramount by providing courts with discretion when it is needed to protect
the child.
Custodial relocation is a topic that evokes strong emotional responses, especially
in the parties directly involved. Nothing is more likely to disturb post-divorce
stability between ex-spouses than the custodial parent's' decision to relocate. The
news of the custodial parent's intention to relocate can be devastating to a
noncustodial parent who has been very involved in parenting the couple's child. The
noncustodial parent views the move as an infringement on his or her visitation
rights and a threat to the parent-child relationship.
On the other hand, the custodial parent believes that he or she should not be
"held hostage" by the noncustodial parent. Relocation cases often arise after there
has been a remarriage, with children born of the remarriage, when the new spouse
receives a job transfer to another city. The custodial parent argues that he or she
should not be made to "choose" between the children of the two marriages.
This article reviews the different approaches currently applied by each of the
various states. This article next discusses a myriad of factors, including social
science research, that should be considered in making relocation decisions based on
protecting the child's interests. In doing so, this article prioritizes the twin goals of
avoiding litigation where possible and when litigation is necessary, resolving it
pursuant to the child's best interests. Finally, this article proposes a model
relocation statute, incorporating the recommendations discussed herein.
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1. This paper uses the traditional terms "custodial parent" to refer to the parent with whom the child
primarily lives and "noncustodial parent" to refer to the other parent. Some courts and legislatures, however, have
begun to use less adversarial terms such as "primary residential parent" and "non-primary residential parent." The
use of such non-adversarial terms is encouraged in Part Vii. G, infra; however, the more familiar terms are used
in the text of this Article for the benefit of the reader.
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I. BACKGROUND
At the time of the initial custody decree,2 parties are free to structure their own
custodial arrangements. The court will adopt the agreed upon arrangements in its
decree, upon a finding that such arrangements are in the best interests of the child.3
If the parties cannot agree on custody, courts generally have wide discretion to order
a custodial arrangement, based on the best interests of the child4 and often taking
into account specific factors set out in the state's statutes or case law.5
Once the initial determination of custody has been made, either by agreement of
the parties or by the court, it is afforded some deference based on recognition both
of the child's need for stability in the custodial arrangement and of the harm
inflicted on the child who is subjected to continued conflict between the parents.6
The general rule is that custody cannot be changed, absent a showing of substantial
and material change of circumstances, occurring after entry of the original custody
decree, such that the welfare of the child requires a change in custody.'
Relocation, however, often precipitates a petition to change custody. There is
very little agreement among the various states regarding proper resolution of the
relocation issue.' In fact, there is disagreement on the preliminary issue of whether,
and to what extent, a proposed relocation constitutes a sufficient, substantial and
material change of circumstances to justify a petition to modify custody. In some
states, relocation is per se evidence of a material change of circumstances.9 In other

2. The initial custody decree is usually rendered at the time of the divorce if the parents were married; the
decree can also be rendered in conjunction with a legitimization proceeding when the parties ar not married.
3. See, e.g., McClain v. McClain, 716 P.2d 381, 385 (Alaska 1986) (holding that the parties' agreement
is not binding on the court, and the court must independently determine what arrangement is in the best interests
of the child); Keen v. Keen 629 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Ind.Ct App. 1994) (stating that court should defer to the parents'
agreement when they are capable of carrying it out without court intervention, unless the agreement is dangerous
to the child, or not in child's best interests); In re Marriage of Fesolowitz, 852 P.2d 658, 662 (Mont. 1993) (noting
that court is not bound by the stipulations of the parties, but may order a custody arrangement it believes to be in
the best interests of the child).
4. See, e.g., In the Interest of R.R., 474 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. App. 1996).
5. See cases and statutes cited infra note 13.
6. See infra notes 7-39 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1(b) (1997) ((1) change in any material conditions or circumstances
of a party or the child, or (2) without such showing once in each two-year period following the date of entry of the
judgment); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(2)(A) (1994) (requiring a material change of circumstances); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (1972) (requiring a material change of circumstances); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7 (1997)
(requiring a change of circumstances); Cloutier v. Lear, 691 A.2d 660, 662 (Me. 1997) (requiring a change in
circumstances sufficiently substantial in its effect upon the best interests of the child as to justify a modification);
Gazo v. Gazo, 697 A.2d 342, 345 (Vt. 1997) (requiring a "real, substantial and unanticipated change of
circumstances,"(citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 1 668 (1989 & Supp. 1998))).
8. See Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434,437 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) ("[O]ur research has failed to reveal a
consistent, universally accepted approach to the question of when a custodial parent may relocate out-of-state over
the objection of the noncustodial parent. In fact, the opposite is true. Across the country, applicable standards
remain distressingly disparate."). See also Carol Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and
Custodial Parents: Public Policy Past and Present, 30 FAM. LQ. 245 (1996) (summarizing the jurisprudence of
various states on the relocation issue as of 1996).
9. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(E) (West Supp. 1998) (allowing nonmoving parent the
automatic right to oppose relocation if petition filed within 30 days, otherwise petitioner must show good cause);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(8A) (West 1998) (stating that a relocation of 150 miles may be considered substantial
change of circumstances); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1620 (1994) (stating that relocation to another state or removal
from this state for more than 90 days may be considered substantial change of circumstances); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19-A § 1657 (West 1998) (stating that relocation to another state, beyond 60 miles of residence, or notice
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states, relocation, alone, is not sufficient to reopen the custody issue. Some
statutes require parental consent or court approval in order to relocate."
If the threshold requirements have been met to hear the petition to allow or
prevent relocation, the court applies the appropriate standard. States differ on the
standard to be used. For example, some states use a general "best interests of the
13
child standard." 2 Others use a best interest standard defined by stated factors.

of such relocation constitutes a substantial change in circumstances that warrants a party to petition the court for
modification); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.411 (1997) (stating that relocation to another state by either parent is a
change of circumstances); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108 (Supp. 1998) (allowing custody modification if relocation
is outside the state or more than 100 miles away). House v. House, 779 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Alaska 1989);
Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948, 951 (Idaho 1993) (holding that a relocation that prevents compliance with
existing custody order constitutes a substantial change of circumstances); Evans v. Lungrin, 708 So. 2d 731,738
(La 1998) (stating that relocation outside of the state is considered a material change of circumstances making the
original custody order unworkable); Rowland v. Kingman, 629 A.2d 613,615 (Me. 1993); Domingues v. Johnson,
593 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Md. 1991) (noting that relocation constitutes changed circumstances if best interests of child
require change of custody).
10. See, e.g., Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 482 (Cal. 1996) (requiring noncustodial parent to show
that relocation must cause the child to suffer detriment, rendering it essential or expedient that custody be changed);
In the Interest of R.R., 474 S.E.2d 12, 17 (Ga. App. 1996); Lamb v. Wenning, 600 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Ind. 1992)
(stating that relocation is not per se a substantial change of circumstances); Mennemeyer v. Mennemeyer, 887
S.W.2d 555, 558 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (requiring a showing of inability or bad faith refusal of the other party to
cooperate in the child's upbringing); Hensgens v. Hensgens, 653 So. 2d 48, 53 (La. CL App. 1995); Costantini v.
Costantini, 521 N.W.2d 1,1 (Mich. 1994) (Riley, J., concurring) (stating that change of domicile does not warrant
a review of the best interests factors); Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996) (stating that
custody statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18(d) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999), contains an implied presumption that
removal will be permitted); Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841, 846 (Miss. 1990) (stating that relocation is not per se
evidence of material change of circumstance); Dobos v. Dobos, 431 S.E.2d 861, 863 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (noting
that relocation alone is not a substantial change of circumstance), overruled by Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898,
899 (N.C. 1998) (to the extent that Dobos required a showing of adversity resulting from the change of
circumstances); In re Marriage of Teel-King, 944 P.2d 323,326 (Or. CL App. 1997) (holding that relocation, alone,
was not a substantial change of circumstance); Fossum v. Fossum, 545 N.W.2d 828, 833 (S.D. 1996) (holding that
70-mile move was not a substantial and material change); Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 332 (Tenn; 1993);
Gazo v. Gazo, 697 A.2d 342, 345 (Vt. 1997) (stating that relocation alone is not sufficient). But see Pitt v. Olds,
511 S.E.2d 60, 62 (S.C. 1999) (holding that primary residential parent's desire to relocate in order to live with her
new husband was not a sufficient change of circumstances to modify the existing consent decree that enjoined
either parent from relocating the child without court approval).
11. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175(3) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999) (custodial parent cannot relocate
the child to another state without court order or consent of the noncustodial parent, when the noncustodial parent
has been given visitation rights by the decree); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West 1993) (requiring consent of mature
child or consent of both parents, or court approval for immature child, in order to remove children native to state
or those residing in state for five years or more); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-07 (1997) (requiring consent of
noncustodial parent or court order, unless the noncustodial parent has failed to exercise visitation for one year or
has moved out of state and more than fifty miles from the custodial parent); Dehring v. Dehring, 559 N.W.2d 59,
60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that state statute requires court approval or parental consent for interstate
relocations, but not for intrastate relocations).
12. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(1) (1997); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-103 (1991); Maeda
v. Maeda, 794 P.2d 268, 270 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990) (mother required to prove that relocation would be in best
interests of child); Evans v. Lungrin, 708 So. 2d 731,738 (La. 1998) (party seeking modification of a stipulated
judgment must prove a material change of circumstances since the original judgment and that the modification is
in the best interest of the child); Harder v. Harder, 524 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Neb. 1994) (requiring relocating parent
to show legitimate reason for the move and that the move is in the child's best interests); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo,
113 N.M. 57, 823 P.2d 299, 309 (1991) (holding that the court may adopt a plan that promotes the child's best
interests); In re Marriage of Duckett, 905 P.2d 1170, 1171 (Or. Ct.App. 1995) (giving primary consideration to
the child's best interest); Parish v. Spaulding, 496 S.E.2d 91 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (applying best interest test
retroactively to custodial parent's relocation without court approval).
13. See, e.g., Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371 (Alaska 1996) citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (1998)
which states:
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Some states employ a heightened best interest standard. 4 And, some states use an
endangerment standard."5

In determining the best interests of the child the court shall consider
(1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs of the child;
(2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet these needs;
(3) the child's preference if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a preference;
(4) the love and affection existing between the child and each parent;
(5) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the
desirability of maintaining continuity;
(6) the desire and ability of each parent to allow an open and loving frequent relationship
between the child and the other parent;
(7) any evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child neglect in the proposed
custodial household or a history of violence between the parents;
(8) evidence that substance abuse by either parent or other members of the household
directly affects the emotional or physical well-being of the child;
(9) other factors that the court considers pertinent.
See also ARr. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(J) (West Supp. 1998) (listing seven nonexclusive factors); DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 722, 729 (1993 & Supp. 1998) (listing seven factors that apply when the petition is brought at least
two years after the prior custody decree; otherwise an "endangerment or impairment" standard applies); FLA. STAT.
ch. 61.13(2Xd) (Supp. 1997) (listing five "relocation" factors plus thirteen "best interests" factors); IDAHO CODE
§ 32-717 (Michie 1996) (listing seven factors); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-17-2-8, -21, -23 (Michie 1997) (court will
consider seven "best interests" factors as well as the distance involved in the move and the hardship and expense
involved in maintaining visitation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1998) (listing seven factors); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1998) (listing eight factors applicable to cases ofjoint custody);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 1653(3) (West 1998) (stating fifteen factors); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212
(1997) (stating thirteen factors); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.24,767.327 (West Supp. 1998) (listing eleven and three
factors respectively); Staab v. Hurst, 868 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Ark. App. 1984) (stating five factors); In re Smith, 665
N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (M. 1996) (stating five factors); Dehfring v. Dehring, 559 N.W.2d 59,61 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(stating four factors); Shaw v. Shaw, 951 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Mo. CL App. 1997) (stating four factors); Tropea v.
Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151-52, 152 n.2 (N.Y. 1996) (stating six factors); Paulson v. Bauske, 574 N.W.2d 801,
803 (N.D. 1998) (stating four factors); Zalenko v. White, 701 A.2d 227. 228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (stating three
factors); Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Wyo. 1993) (stating four factors).
14. See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(E)(lXa) (Anderson 1996) (best interests and harm "caused
by a change in environment is outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment"); Ex pare Murphy,
670 So. 2d 51, 53 (Ala. 1995) (citing Ex pare McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1984) (material changed
circumstances since the last decree that would result in positive good for the child's welfare from a change of
custody and the benefit from the change must exceed the negative effect of disrupting the child's current custodial
placement)); In re Mayfield, 577 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa CL App. 1998) (nonrelocating parent seeking
modification must show the ability to offer superior care); Williams v. Pitney, 567 N.E.2d 894, 897 (Mass. 1991)
(real advantage standard); Garrison v. Mulcahy, 636 A.2d 732, 733 (R.L 1993) (best interests and compelling
reason for the relocation); Wood v. O'Donnell, 894 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. CL App. 1995) (in joint conservatorship,
the movant must show that modification would be a positive improvement for and in the best interest of the child);
Anderson v. Newman, 439 S.E.2d 442,444 (W. Va. 1993) (child's welfare must be materially promoted by the
change in custody).
15. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-131.5 (West 1997); DEL CODEANN. tit. 13, § 729 (1993
& Supp. 1998) (applying an endangerment or impairment standard if the petition is brought within two years of
the prior decree; otherwise, a best interest test based on seven factors applies); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.340
(Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1998); In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) (requiring an
endangerment standard for sole custody cases); Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d. 185, 187 (Del. 1991); Evans v. Lungrin,
708 So. 2d 731, 738 (La. 1998) (requiring non-domiciliary parent to prove that the continuation of the present
custody arrangement is so deleterious to the child as to justify a modification or prove that the harm of the change
of environment is substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child); Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639,
642 (Minn. 1996) (requiring changed circumstances that endanger the child's physical or emotional health, citing
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18(d) (West 1995)); Stevison v. Woods, 560 So. 2d 176, 179 (Miss. 1990) (requiring
"[pleculiar or unusual circumstances adversely affecting the children over and above the effect attendant upon the
mere increase in miles between the children and the non-custodial parent"); In re Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362, 1370
(en banc) (Wash. 1997) (interpreting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191(3) (West 1997) to require a showing
of "more than the normal distress suffered by a child because of travel, infrequent contact of a parent, or other
hardships" to support a finding that relocation would harm the child).
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Certain states recognize a presumption, in favor of relocation,16 while others
recognize a presumption against relocation or focus on the interruption of the

noncustodial parent's visitation.17 Other states do not recognize a presumption

either way. 8 Still other states, while not imposing a presumption, nevertheless, give
great deference to the importance of stability and continuity of care.' 9
The burden of proof also varies among states and has essentially the same effect
as a presumption, even though it is not designated as such. Some states place the
burden of proof on the relocating parent to show that the move serves the child's

16. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501 (West 1994) (stating that custodial parent has a right to relocate
absent a court finding that the move would be detrimental to the child); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (West 1997) § 1410-131; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 19 (West 1998) (stating that custodial parent has a right to relocate, subject
to the court's power to restrain a relocation prejudicial to the child's rights or welfare); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 255-13 (Michie 1992) (noting a right to relocate subject to court's power to restrain move prejudicial to child); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-6-108 (Supp. 1998) (stating presumption in favor of relocation for primary residential parent,
subject to exceptions); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.3 (1998) (stating that court may designate custodian who has
sole legal right to determine residence of child); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.327 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (stating
rebuttable presumption that continuing the child's physical placement with the primary residential parent is in the
child's best interests); Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 479 (Cal. 1996) (noting that the paramount need for
continuity and stability in custody arrangements-and the harm that may result from disruption of established
patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker-weigh heavily in favor of maintaining ongoing
custody arrangements); In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776, 785 (Colo. 1996) (noting that presumption can
be overcome by proof of one of three statutory factors or by showing that the negative impact of relocation
outweighs the benefits of remaining with the custodial parent, taking into account four common-law factors);
Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639,641 (Minn. 1996); Jaramillo v. Jaramilo, 113 N.M. 57, 59 823 P.2d 299,
301 (1991) (recognizing a presumption in favor of the relocating parent having sole custody); Wood v. O'Donnell,
894 S.W.2d 555, 557 (1995) (requiring the movant, in joint conservatorship, to show that modification would be
a positive improvement for, and in the best interests of the child); Bower v. Reich, 964 P.2d 359, 364 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that relocation is a "minor modification" under the provisions of WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.260 (West 1997) requiring the custodial parent to show only a substantial change in her own
circumstances); Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1288-89 (Wyo. 1993) (noting that removal should be granted as long
as the court is satisfied with the relocating parent's motives and reasonable visitation is possible).
17. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.3 (1998) (court may designate county of residence of child); In
re Marriage of Elser, 895 P.2d 619, 622-23 (Mont. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Porter v. Galarneau, 911
P.2d 1143 (Mont. 1996) (focusing exclusively on the disruption of the father's visitation that would result if the
custodial mother were allowed to remove the couple's children from the state so that she could further her
education); Levine v. Bacon, 705 A.2d 1204 (NJ. 1998) (denying custodial father permission to relocate because
move would adversely affect mother's visitation and would not be in child's best interest); Holder v. Polanski, 544
A.2d 852, 854-55 (N.J. 1988) (finding that the New Jersey removal statute was aimed at preserving the rights of
the noncustodial parent and the child to maintain and develop their familial relationship); McAlister v. Patterson,
299 S.E.2d 322, 323 (S.C. 1982) (recognizing a presumption against removal); See also Paula M. Raines, Joint
Custody and the Right to Travel: Legal and Psychological Implications, 24 J. FAM. L 625 (1985-86) (arguing that
relocation should seldom be granted because the benefit of the move rarely outweighs the psychological detriment
to the children and the remaining parent).
18. See, e.g., FIA. STAT. ch. 61.13(2)(b) (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108 (Supp. 1998) (noting no
presumption in cases of actual, substantially equal residential parenting); In re Marriage of Whipp, 962 P.2d 1058
(Kan. 1998) (stating that best interests of the child controls when the custody issue is between parents); Jaramillo
v. Jaramillo, 113 N.M. 57, 59, 65, 823 P.2d 299, 301, 307 (1991) (declining to recognize a presumption in favor
of the relocating parent or the resisting parent in cases involving joint legal custody, even when one parent is the
primary residential parent, but recognizing a presumption in favor of the existing joint custody arrangement).
19. See, e.g., Vachon v. Pugiese, 931 P.2d 371,380 (Alaska 1996) (finding the statutory factors of stability
and continuity controlling the results of the case); In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776, 784 (Colo. 1996) (en
banc) (noting that the presumption in favor of relocation is based on legislative preference for stability); Goldmeier
v. Lepselter, 598 A.2d 482 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (noting that stability of maintaining the current physical
custody is a substantial factor to consider); Paulson v. Bauske, 574 N.W.2d 801, 803 (N.D. 1998) (emphasizing
the importance of "maintaining 'the continuity and stability of the integrated family unit"') (citation omitted); In
re Marriage of Duckett, 905 P.2d 1170, 1171 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that "maintaining the stability of
the primary parental relationship is the overriding consideration").
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best interest." Other states place the burden of proof on the nonrelocating parent to
show that the move is detrimental, 2 or that the modification of custody is in the
child's best interests.2 2 Still others impose no burden of proof, allowing the court
to make a best interest determination, as in an original custody determination.2 3
Some states require that the custodial parent show a legitimate reason for the
move, usually defined as one that is not based primarily on a desire to interfere with
20. See, e.g., ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408 (West Supp. 1997); 750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/609 (West
1993) (stating that burden is on relocating parent to prove that removal is in the child's best interests); Vachon v.
Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371, 376 (Alaska 1996); House v. House, 779 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Alaska 1989) (custodial parent
must show that, given the move, it is in the child's best interest to remain in that parent's custody); Staab v. Hurst,
868 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Ark. App. 1994) (burden of demonstrating some real advantage to the custodial family unit
resulting from the move); Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 682 (Conn. 1998) (burden to prove that the relocation
is for a legitimate purpose and to a reasonable location); Katherine A.C. v. Dennis C., 1998 WL 420755 (Del. Fain.
Ct. 1998) (burden to prove that the move will enhance the overall quality of the child's life, citing the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyer's Model Relocation Act); Maeda v. Maeda, 794 P.2d 268, 270 (Haw. Ct. App.
1990) (mother required to prove that relocation would be in best interests of child); Harder v. Harder, 524 N.W.2d
325, 326 (Neb. 1994) (requiring relocating parent to show legitimate reason for the move and that the move is in
the child's best interests); Cook v. Cook, 898 P.2d 702, 705 (Nev. 1995) (requiring custodial parent to show that
move will result in actual advantage to parent and child, then shifting burden to noncustodial parent to show that
the move would be adverse to the child's interests); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 113 N.M. 57, 65, 823 P.2d 299, 307
(1991) (placing a burden on the relocating parent, in cases involving joint legal custody, to produce evidence that
the arrangement is no longer workable and needs to be changed); Burnham v. Basta, 659 N.Y.S.2d 945, 947 (1997)
(concluding that custodial parent seeking relocation had "not met her burden of demonstrating ... that the
relocation" would serve child's best interests); Paulson v. Bauske, 574 N.W.2d 801, 802 (N.D. 1998) (requiring
custodial parent to prove that the move is in the best interests of child); Rozborski v. Rozborski, 686 N.E.2d 546,
547 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (placing burden on the moving party to show that relocation is in best interest of child);
Garrison v. Mulcahy, 636 A.2d 732,733 (R.I. 1993) (stating that custodial parent has burden to show compelling
reason for move and that move is in the best interests of the child).
21. See, e.g., Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473,482-83 (Cal. 1996) (placing burden on noncustodial parent
to show that relocation would not be in best interests of the child); Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 682 (Conn.
1998) (placing burden on relocating parent to prove that relocation is not in the child's best interests after the
relocating parent proves that the relocation is for a legitimate purpose and to a reasonable location); Evans v.
Lungrin, 708 So. 2d 731, 738 (La. 1998) (stating that nondomiciliary parent bears burden of proving major
decisions are not in best interests of child); Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996) (party
opposing relocation must show that move is not in the child's best interests and would endanger the child's health
and well-being); Stevison v. Woods, 560 So. 2d 176, 179 (Miss. 1990) (placing burden on nonrelocating parent
to show "peculiar or unusual circumstances adversely affecting the children over and above the effect attendant
upon the mere increase in miles between the children and the non-custodial parent"); Cook v. Cook, 898 P.2d 702,
705-07 (Nev. 1995) (custodial parent has initial burden to show that move will result in real advantage to parent
and child, then noncustodial parent has burden to show that the move would be adverse to the child's interests);
Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852, 856 (N.J. 1988) (allowing relocation absent showing of harm avoids
constitutional infringement on parent's right to travel); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 113 N.M. 57, 63, 823 P.2d 299, 305
(1991) (placing the burden of proof on the relocating parent impermissibly impairs the constitutionally protected
right to travel). See also Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation:A ConstitutionalPerspective, 34 U.
LouIsvnLE J. FAM. L 1 (1996) (advancing a constitutional argument for imposing burden of proof on party
opposing relocation). But see, Carlson v. Carlson, 661 P.2d 833, 836 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding restriction
on the residence of the custodial parent to protect best interest of the child); Rozborski v. Rozborski, 686 N.E.2d
546, 548 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (denying custodial parent's constitutional arguments).
22. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.327 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (burden of proof is on the parent
objecting to relocation); Osteraw v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948, 951 (Idaho 1993) (party moving for modification bears
the burden of demonstrating that the modification serves the child's best interests).
23. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108 (Supp. 1998) (no burden when residential time is actually
shared substantially equally); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 113 N.M. 57, 67, 823 P.2d 299, 309 (1991) (neither party has
the burden to show that relocation is or is not in the child's best interests where legal custody is shared); RamirezBarker v. Barker, 418 S.E.2d 675, 679 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that party seeking modification must show
change of circumstances, but neither party bears the burden of proving best interests of the child), overruled by
Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898 (N.C. 1998) (to the extent that Ramirez-Barkerrequired a showing of adversity
resulting from the change of circumstances).
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the noncustodial parent's relationship with the child.24 The noncustodial parent's
good faith opposition to relocation is considered by some states.25
Notice requirements also differ among the states. Some states impose no notice
requirements. Others require advance notice when a parent decides to relocate with
the child either outside the state or at a great distance away within the state.26 Of
those states requiring notice, failure to notify may even affect custody or
visitation.27 However, some states prohibit custodial changes based on failure to
comply with notice requirements.2"

24. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175(3) (West 1998) (court shall not permit relocation "if the purpose
of the move is to interfere with visitation rights"); Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371 (Alaska 1996) (quoting House
v. House, 779 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Alaska 1989) ("Most states permit custodial parents to move out of state with their
children if there is a legitimate reason for the move.")); Pollock v. Pollock, 889 P.2d 633, 636 (Ariz. App. 1995)
(holding that "any sincere, good-faith reason will suffice"); In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776, 784 (Colo.
1996) (requiring custodial parent to show a sensible reason for the move); Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 681
(Conn. 1998) (requiring proof that relocation is for a legitimate purpose, adopting the position recommended by
the American Law Institute, discussed infra Part VlIRC.); Williams v. Pitney, 567 N.E.2d 894, 897 (Mass. 1991)
(noting "absence of a motive to deprive the noncustodial parent of contact" as a factor to be considered).
25. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(J)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
26. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(C) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring 60 days notice for a move
outside the state or more than 100 miles within the state).GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1(c)(3) (1998) (requiring 30 days
notice, except wher otherwise provided by court order); 759 IlL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/609 (West 1993) (requiring
notification for temporary removal); IND. CODE AiN. § 31-17-2-23 (Michie 1997) (requiring notice when relocating
outside the state or 100 miles or more from the county of residence); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1620(a) (1994)
(requiring 21 days notice for relocation exceeding 90 days); L.A. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:355.3, 9:355.4 (West Supp.
1998) (requiring 60 days written notice or notice within 10 days of obtaining information necessary to give notice,
when relocating outside the state or 150 miles within state, unless court provides otherwise); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19-A § 1653(14) (West 1998) (requiring 30 days notice prior to relocation of a child; if relocation must occur
before 30 days then parent must notify as soon as possible); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377(2) (1998) (requiring sixty
days written notice, absent exigent circumstances as determined by the court); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-217
(1997) (requiring 30 days written notice); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (JX4Xa) (1998) (requiring thirty days written
notice); 01O REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051 (GX1) (Anderson 1996) (requiring notice filed with court and copy sent
to non-residential parent, barring exceptions); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.007 (West 1996) (requiring 60 days
written notice or within 5 days of relocating parent's knowledge ofrelocation, unless waived by court, with a copy
to the court); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-37(1) (1998) (reasonable advance written notice of move outside state or
150 or more miles from current residence); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.327(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (requiring
60 days written notice if relocating outside state or 150 miles or more from the other parent for a period exceeding
90 consecutive days); Halliday v. Halliday, 593 A.2d 233, 235 (NH 1991) (interpreting trial court's requirement
that the custodial parent obtain consent of other parent or court's permission prior to relocating as merely ensuring
notice to the other parent of the relocation).
Some statutes give the court discretion to order notification of relocation. See e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3024 (West 1994) (45 days notice, when feasible for relocations of more than 30 days); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 112(c)(5) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999) (court may require relocating parent to notify the other parent of
relocation plans, absent agreement to relocate); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.159 (1990 & Supp. 1998) (court may require
notification if either parent relocates more than 60 miles further away from the other parent); VA. CODE ANN. § 20124.5 (Michie 1995) (requiring 30 days notice).
27. See, e.g., ARIa. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(H) (West Supp. 1998) (allowing relocation only in
accordance with the child's best interests); L4. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:355.6 (West Supp. 1998) (stating that failure
to provide notice of a proposed relocation, or relocation without court authorization, may be a factor when
considering the relocation of a child, the return of the child, and an award of expenses and attorney's fees); MO.
REV. STAT. § 452.377(5) (1997) (stating violation of relocation restrictions may constitute changed circumstances
allowing court to modify custody); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125A.350 (Michie 1993) (stating that noncompliance
with notice provisions may be considered in change of custody); In re Marriage of Whipp, 962 P.2d 1058, 1059
(Kan. 1998) (changing custody to father when mother left the state without notifying father of the move).
28. See, e.g., Eddy v. Napier, 558 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1990) (holding that change of
custody based on failure to give prior notice of relocation was abuse of discretion).
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Where court approval is required, the court may29 or may not3 ° treat an
unauthorized relocation as grounds for changing custody. If relocation is allowed,

some states impose an obligation on the court to attempt to modify visitation to
ensure the continuation and preservation of the noncustodial parent-child
relationship.3' In setting the revised visitation schedule, courts often opt for longer
but less frequent visits to preserve the noncustodial parent-child relationship.32
Some states allow the court to consider a downward deviation in child support
based on the increased travel expenses associated with visitation following
relocation.3 3 Other states allow the court to consider placing the increased travel
expense on the relocating parent.34
Private ordering is endorsed by some states such that agreements of the parties
to allow or disallow relocation is binding unless the court finds that the agreement
no longer serves the child's best interest. 35 In other states, stipulations of the parties
replace the default rules that otherwise apply in relocation cases.36 Some states
restrict private ordering by refusing to permit parties to contract for relocation
restriction clauses,37 or to agree on "automatic" custody modification provisions that
are triggered if one parent relocates. a
Not only are there great differences in approach among the various states when
addressing relocation, but even within states the rules have varied greatly over time

29. See, e.g., Anderson v. Newman, 439 S.E.2d 442, 445 (W. Va. 1993) (noting that lower court placed
great emphasis on unauthorized removal of children to support a change of custody).
30. See, e.g., Lambert v. Lambert, 598 A.2d 561, 566, (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (failure to return children to
father for two weeks due to relocation is grounds for contempt but not for change of custody).
31. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(H) (West Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(2)(b)(1) (1998)
(public policy of Florida to assure that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after
the parents divorce); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (West Supp. 1998); Evans v. Lungrin, 708 So. 2d 731, 737 (La.
1998) (frequent and continuing contact should be maintained with the other parent).
32. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Schwartz, 812 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Nev. 1991); Barstad v. Barstad, 499 N.W.2d 584,
588 (N.D. 1993); Fortin v. Fortin, 500 N.W.2d 229,232 (S.D. 1993); Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319,331 (Tenn.

1993).
33. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108(b) (Supp. 1998); In re Marriage of Condon, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d
33, 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); In re Marriage of Osbom, 564 N.E.2d 1325, 1336 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
34. See, e.g., Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473,484 (Cal. 1996). But see Katz v. Katz, 445 S.E.2d 531, 531
(Ga. 1994) (finding abuse of discretion where trial court ordered custodial parent to deliver the children to the
noncustodial parent every Thursday and ordered the noncustodial parent to pay half of the children's expense but
none of the custodial parent's expense).
35. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408() (West Supp. 1998) (rebuttable presumption that a
provision in a parenting plan or other agreement is in the child's best interest); Landingharn v. Landingham, 685
So. 2d 946, 950 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing trial court's denial of custodial parent's request to set aside
relocation restriction where doing so would be in child's best interest); Williams v. Pitney, 567 N.E.2d 894, 898
(Mass. 1991) (parties' relocation restriction may be ignored by court, which must focus on whether relocation
provides real advantage for child).
36. See, e.g., Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 152 n.2 (N.Y. 1996) (geographic restriction agreed to by
the parties might be an additional factor for the court to consider in determining best interests); deBeaumont v.
Goodrich, 644 A.2d 843, 846 (Vt. 1994) (parties' stipulation that relocation would trigger evaluation of parental
rights and responsibilities was enforceable where parties shared physical custody nearly equally, even though state's
relocation standards did not contain such provisions).
37. See, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841, 845-46 (Miss. 1990) (refusing to enforce relocation restriction
requiring child to remian in same community until age of majority); In re Marriageof Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362,
1372 (Wash. 1997) (finding that relocation restrictions in parties' agreements are not enforceable).
38. See, e.g., Hovaterv. Hovater, 577 So. 2d 461,463 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) ("reversionary" custody clause
is unenforceable).
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as the courts and legislatures have struggled to find a panacea.39 Different

39. Tennessee, for example, has adopted a number of approaches over the years that went from an almost
absolute rule allowing relocation to a series of cases that applied a best interest standard and had the effect of
making relocation much more difficult to obtain. See Evans v. Evans, 140 S.W. 745, 746 (Tenn. 1911) (noting that
noncustodial parent has no voice as to where the child shall reside); Walker v. Walker 656 S.W.2d 11, 18 (Tenn.
Ct App. 1983) (placing burden on the nonrelocating party to show adversity). Later, the court shifted the burden
from the party opposing the move, to the party seeking to move, or to the party filing a petition, either to move or
to prevent the move. See Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422 (Tenn. 1988). These cases led to a significant increase
inlitigation opposing relocation decisions. See Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 326 (Tenn. 1993).
The current trend in other states is clearly in the direction of allowing greater discretion in the custodial
parent to relocate. See id. Tennessee's Supreme Court joined that trend in 1996, coming full circle in its position
on custodial relocation, again adopting, inAaby v. Strange,924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996), an almost absolute rule
allowing relocation. In Aaby,the court held that the custodial parent was free to relocate with the child "unless the
noncustodial parent proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the custodial parent's motives for moving
were vindictive-that is, intended to defeat or deter the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent." Id. at 629.
However, if the act of removal itself could pose a "specific, serious threat of harm" to the child, the noncustodial
parent could file a petition for change of custody based on a material change of circumstances. See it The Aaby
court provided examples illustrating a "specific, serious threat of harm" including:
1. Wanting to take a child with a serious medical problem to an area where no adequate
treatment is readily available;
2. Wanting to take a child with special educational requirements to an area with no acceptable
educational facilities, or
3. Wanting to move and take up residence with a person with a confirmed history of child
abuse.
Id. at 629 n.2. It is only when the circumstances have changed to the extent that "the behavior of the custodial
parent clearly posits a danger to the physical, mental or emotional well-being of the child," that a court was justified
in changing custody. Id. at 629. Barring any of the foregoing exceptions, the only issue for a Tennessee court in
a relocation case is modification of the noncustodial parent's visitation schedule.
In 1998, the legislature responded to Aaby,a case perceived by some as placing too much emphasis on the
rights of the custodial parent and giving too little protection to the child's interest, by passing a statute designed
to focus on the child's interest and to address other issues such as the frivolous move, shared physical custody, the
noncustodial parent who is the primary psychological parent, international relocations, and mediation. See TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-6-108 (Supp. 1998). The text of this statute forms much of the basis of the author's recommended
statute found infra Part IX.B. See also, Richards, CustodialRelocation: Tennessee's New Approach, 7 TENN. FAM.
LAW LTR. 11 (1993); Richards, Custodial Relocation Revisited: Have We Thrown Out the Baby With the Bath
Water? 10 TENN. FAM. LAW LTR. 13 (1996).
New Jersey is another state that has changed its approach repeatedly over the years. The Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, authored the D'Onofrio factors for making a best interest determination in relocation
cases, which were adopted by many other states. See infra note 116. See also D'Onofrio v. D'Onoftio, 365 A.2d
27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). The court later required the custodial parent to show a "real advantage" to
relocation. Doing so would shift the burden to the noncustodial parent to show that the proposed visitation schedule
would be so burdensome as to unreasonably affect the noncustodial parent-child relationship. See Cooper v.
Cooper, 491 A.2d 606, 613 (NJ. 1984). In order to afford the custodial parent the same freedom of movement as
the noncustodial parent, the New Jersey Supreme Court modified its test again to require only that the custodial
parent show any good faith, sincere reason for the relocation. See Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852, 856 (N.J.
1988). A real advantage need not be shown. See id The courts continued to focus on the rights of the noncustodial
parent, however, prohibiting relocation on the ground that extended periods of visitation could not substitute for
frequent contact between the noncustodial parent and child. See Levine v. Bacon, 705 A2d 1204, 1206 (NJ. 1998).
The burden of proving that the relocation visitation schedule is too burdensome is on the noncustodial parent. See
id.
In Florida, the lower courts were applying three different standards, one favoring relocation, one opposing
relocation, and one remaining neutral until the Florida Supreme Court decided Russenbergerv. Russenberger,669
So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1996). In Russenberger, the court adopted a presumption in favor of relocation where the move
is made in good faith and not as a vindictive action against the other parent. See id See also Judge James S.
Moody, Jr. & Philip S. Wartenberg, The Birth of a Legal Presumption:The Law's Latest Answer to a Difficult
SociologicalProblem: GeographicalRelocationsAfter Dissolution, 70 FLA. BJ. 68 (1996) (citing Russenberger,
669 So. 2d 1044). The following year the legislature amended the relocation statute specifically to provide that
"[n]o presumption shall arise in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks
to move the child and the move will materially affect the cunent schedule of contact and access with the secondary
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philosophical approaches may help explain the lack of uniformity.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES
Much of the difference in approach in relocation cases stems primarily from two
theories. The first is a focus on parental rights as opposed to children's rights. The
second is a difference of opinion as to whether it truly is in the child's best interests
for one party to be able to require the court to make a best interest determination in
every relocation case.
Focus on ParentalRights v. Child's Rights
Courts' opinions and advocates often couch the relocation issue in terms of its
effect on the parents involved.' This focus on parental rights is understandable
since the attorneys representing the parents make arguments on behalf of their
clients, who are the parties requesting that the court protect their rights.4
For example, the noncustodial parent may argue a right to the ongoing exercise
of visitation, and charge that the custodial parent is free to move, but cannot remove
the child from the jurisdiction without first satisfying some standard of proof
regarding either the necessity of the move, or the benefits for the child, or both.42
The custodial parent may argue that custody has already been awarded on the
basis of a best interest determination and that there is no need for another best
interest analysis simply because the custodial parent is relocating. The custodial
arrangement is staying the same; the parties are simply relocating, requiring an
adjustment in the visitation schedule of the noncustodial parent. The custodial
parent thus claims a right to relocate absent some showing of harm to the child.
The proper role for the court and the legislature is much clearer if the focus is
placed on the child's best interests rather than the parent's rights. The Supreme

A.

residential parent." FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(2)(d) (1998). The court must make a best interest determination based

on factors enumerated in the statute. ld
40. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 889 P.2d 633, 635 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("The competing rights at the
heart of this case are the Mother's right to travel and the Father's right to maintain a meaningful relationship with
his child. These rights must be adjusted in accordance with the best interests of the child"); D'Onofrio v.
D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (noting that noncustodial parent is free to leave the
jurisdiction so the custodial parent should have the same right to relocate to seek a better life and custodial parent
should not be tethered to the noncustodial parent's choice of residence).
41.

See generally Bradley A. Grundy,The Trial: Proposing Relocation, 20 FAM. ADVOC. Fall 1997, at 37

(offering strategies for representing the relocating parent); Dorene Marcus and Jeffrey L Garfinkel, The Trial:
Opposing Relocation, 20 FAM.ADvoc. Fall 1997, at 41 (offering strategies for representing the noncustodial
parent); Carlton D. Stansbury & Gwendolyn G.Connolly, Map Out Your Relocation Case on the Web, 20 FAM.
ADvoc. Spring 1998, at 43 (explaining use of World Wide Web to prepare case either advocating or opposing
relocation).
42. See Merril Sobie, Whatever Happened to the "Best Interests" Analysis in New York Relocation Cases?
A Response, 15 PACE L REV. 685 (1995) (arguing that relocation should be allowed only upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances). But see IaFrance,supra note 21, at 68 (arguing that the custodial parent is not really
permitted a "choice." "The mother still has the "right" to travel, but she may exercise itonly by abandoning the
children whom she has borne, raised, loved, for whom she has made all of the investments and sacrifices of a loving
parent and as to whom she had been deemed the appropriate custodial parent."); Rozborski v. Rozborski, 686
N.E.2d 546, 548 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (denying custodial parent's constitutional argument and stating that
custodial parent was never ordered to stay in the county).

Spring 1999]

THE CUSTODIAL RELOCATION CONUNDRUM

Court of Connecticut recently endorsed this child-centered approach in Ireland v.
43
Ireland:
We recognize the difficult issues that relocation cases present. The interests of
the custodial parent who wishes to begin a new life in a new location are in
conflict with those of the noncustodial parent who may have a strong desire to
maintain regular contact with the child. At the heart of the dispute is the child,
whose best interests must always be the court's paramount concern. Those
interests do not necessarily coincide, however, with those of one or both
parents.'
From the child's perspective, the role of the court and the legislature is to establish
rules that balance the child's need for stability and continuity in the custodial
relationship with the child's need to have a loving and nurturing relationship with
both parents. The focus is not on the parents' entitlements, but on the child's needs
and the best way to meet the child's needs in light of the relocation.
B.

Threshold Standardsfor HearingRelocation Cases
Courts and legislature may agree that the focus of relocation decisions should be
on the child's rights rather than the parents' rights. They may also agree that the
polestar of relocation cases is the best interests of the child, just as it is in other
custody determinations. Nevertheless, courts and legislatures are unlikely to agree
on the outcome of relocation cases. Disagreement arises over what constitutes the
best interests of the child, and whether to begin with a presumption in favor of, or
against relocation.4 Supporters of the custodial parent may argue that a default rule
in favor of continuity of custody is in the child's best interests. Supporters of the
noncustodial parent may argue that maintaining the status quo and disallowing
relocation of the child, absent compelling circumstances, is in the best interests of
the child. They may also argue that there should be no presumption and that a
relocation, alone, is a sufficient basis for the court to reopen the custody determination and make a best interest determination anew.
Assuming that courts should act in the best interests of the child, how do courts
determine what that best interest is? Obviously, it would be best if both parents
would remain in the same location and cooperate in rearing the child after the
divorce. Courts, however, do not prohibit noncustodial parents from moving, even
where it can be shown that the move would be detrimental to the child.' Courts do
not prohibit custodial parents from moving either, technically speaking.4 7 Rather,
the court just rules that the child cannot be removed from the jurisdiction and orders
custody to be transferred to the other parent if the custodial parent relocates.4" Such

43. 717 A.2d 676 (Conn. 1998). See also Lamb v. Wenning, 600 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ind. 1992) ("echild's
welfare, not that of the parents, should be the primary concern of the trial court.") (citation omitted).
44. Ireland,717 A.2d at 680.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
46. See id.
47. For an opinion adopting this approach, see Maeda v. Maeda, 794 P.2d 268, 270 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990)
(custodial parent is fre to move, but not free to relocate the child absent a showing that relocation serves the child's
best interest).
48. See e.g., Lozinak v. Lozinak, 569 A.2d 353, 354 (Pa. Super. CL 1990).
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a rule generally has the same practical effect as an order prohibiting the custodial
parent from relocating.
Knowing this, should the court make a relocation decision based on whether the
child is better off in the custody of the mother versus the father; or should the court
make the relocation decision on the assumption that denying removal of the child
will cause the custodial parent to abandon plans to relocate, thus maintaining the
status quo, and, arguably, the best interests of the child? 9 Some courts have granted
custody to one parent on the condition that the parent remain in the state and have
further ordered an automatic transfer of custody to the other parent in the event of
a later relocation by the first parent." The Delaware Supreme Court chose not to
affirm the "automatic removal clause" imposed by the family law court in Anderson
v. Anderson5 on the ground that the court could not predict what custodial
arrangement might be in the child's interest in the future and that a new determination should be made in the event of a later relocation by the custodial parent.52 The
Hawaii appellate court, on the other hand, affirmed just such an automatic removal
clause in Maeda v. Maeda3 on the ground that there was no information before the
court about the proposed relocation situation to enable the court to make a
determination as to whether the move would be in the child's best interests.54
Even if the court is justified in denying relocation on the assumption that the
custodial parent will abandon the move, can the court safely assume that if the
custodial parent abandons relocation efforts, that the custodial arrangement will
return to the status quo?55 The custodial parent's plans to relocate have been
frustrated.56 That frustration may affect the custodial parent-child relationship and

49. Cheryl S. Kamer, Relocation: What Ought to Be, 20 FAM. ADvoc. Fall 1997, at 12, 14 (judge
advocating restricting relocation, stating, "[lh]ow much better for the child for the court to retain a good custodian
but deny the relocation, making a decision that really is in the better interest of a child").
50. See, e.g., Maeda v. Maeda, 794 P.2d 268 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990) (custodial award subject to transfer if
custodial parent leaves the jurisdiction); Alfiei v. Alfieri, 105 N.M. 373, 733 P.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1987) (custodial
award contingent upon return to New Mexico); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 594 N.Y.S.2d 276 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)
(custody contingent upon remaining in current school district); Lozinak v. Lozinak, 569 A.2d 353 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990) (custodial award based on remaining in the jurisdiction, otherwise custody would change to other parent).
51. No. 513, 1997, 1998 WL 309848, at *1 (Del. 1998). See also Koenig v. Koenig, 782 S.W.2d 86, 90
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (trial court's conclusion, that if custodial parent chose to relocate it would be in child's best
interest to change custody to other parent, could not stand as court's conclusion amounted to an automatic future
change of custody); Wilson v. Wilson, 408 S.E.2d 576, 579 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (automatic custodial reversal
clause is clearly an abuse of discretion).
52. See Anderson v. Anderson, No. 513,1997 1998 WL 309848, at *I (Del. May 28, 1998).
53. 794 P.2d 268 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990).
54. See iaLat 270.
55. See infra Part IL for an argument that a rettrm to the status quo is not always available.
56. The following is an excerpt from the affidavit filed by a custodial parent who was not allowed to
relocate:
Professor LaFrance and I have been married since ... June [of 1992]. Prior to our marriage, we,
and the children, would often focus our conversations on things we would plan to do as a family,
future goals that we had, trips we would take, and plans for our future together. He and I must
now focus instead on ongoing legal battles. We don't know if there will be a future allowed us.
I must choose between having a husband or having my children. I worry about whether or not
my husband and I will ever be able to move beyond court battles and legal maneuvering or if
the corrosive effects of this Order and its implications will leave us both financially and emotionally bankrupt. The long term survival of our marriage is in jeopardy as a result of the order.
The Order has effectively imprisoned me without walls. I am unable to move from this town,
even though the community and financial stability that were once here for me no longer exist.
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the relationship between the parents is almost certain to deteriorate, at least
temporarily.
The general rule, stated earlier, that courts ordinarily do not allow a parent to
relitigate the custody issue, once an initial determination has been made, absent
some material changed circumstance affecting the child's welfare, is designed to
protect the child." Divorce can be very difficult for children. Young children fear
abandonment, older children fear loss of financial and emotional support, and the
worries of all children are exacerbated when they are exposed to strong parental
conflict."8
In relocation decisions, the child has already been through the breakup of the
family and at least one custody determination. Exposing the child to another court
battle and the stress associated with both parents battling over the child should be
avoided, unless there is greater potential for harm to the child from not having a
hearing. As the Colorado Supreme Court recently noted, "[n]either the child nor the
parents benefit from repeat appearances before the court or from the uncertainty
caused thereby. Instead, uncertainty only serves to threaten the child's stability and
undermine the parties' acceptance of the original award of custody." 9
States should develop a relocation standard containing a presumption in favor or
against relocation, depending on which rule better serves the child's interest in most
instances. Such presumption or default rule would have the effect of greatly
reducing the indeterminacy ° of relocation decisions, thereby reducing the number

I have a husband, yet am not allowed a marriage. My children have a stepfather, yet are denied
an ongoing male presence in their home. I am unable to fully participate in my children's
activities or in activities for myself both because of the uncertain nature of my future and
because of my commitment to try to spend time with my husband.
I have been the primary parent-emotionally, spiritually, and financially-for Eddie and
Meagan both during and since my marriage to their father. To live within the terms of Judge
Beaudoin's Order Iam faced with an impossible choice. I can either choose to remain as the
primary parent for my children or I can enjoy the freedoms that I never before questioned-the
freedom to marry and live with the man I love, the freedom to choose the community within
which I shall live, the freedom to pursue the job of my choosing, the freedom to make my own
decisions about my life. Since I cannot abandon my children, there is. in effect, no choice
available to me.
LaFrance, supra note 21, at 39.
57. See supra text accompanying note 7.
58. See Judith S. Wallerstein and Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal
Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. LQ. 305, 309 (1996).
59. In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776,786 (Colo. 1996). See also Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d
639, 642 (Minn. 1996) (noting the "legislature's preference for permanence and closure on custody matters, except
under the most extraordinary circumstances, where changed circumstances endanger the child's physical or
emotional health," citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18(d) (West 1995)).
60. If relocation can be the sole basis for a custody rehearing, there is no disincentive to filing, as long as
one can afford to do so. If the standard is merely a general "best interest of the child" test, there is every incentive
for the losing side to appeal, again so long as the funds hold out. In a number of cases, the custody decision is
reversed at every stage of the litigation, increasing the incentive for the losing party to appeal. See e.g., Exparte
Murphy, 670 So. 2d 51, 53 (Ala. 1995), citing Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1984) (trial court awarded
custody to the father, court of appeals to the mother, and supreme court to the father); Exparte Jones, 620 So. 2d
4. 6 (Ala. 1992) (citing Wood v. Wood, 333 So. 2d 826, 828 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976)) (trial court awarded custody
to the father, court of appeals to the mother, and supreme court to the father); Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473
(Cal. 1996) (trial court awarded custody to the mother, court of appeals to the father, and supreme court to the
mother).
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of petitions filed6 ' and the number of children subjected to another contested
proceeding.62 Like other presumptions, it would also reduce the burden on already
scant judicial resources as well as provide more consistency and predictability in
relocation decisions.6 3
The relocation presumption should, however, be rebuttable in those instances in
which the child's best interests are not served by the presumption. In such cases, the
court should have discretion to make a best interest determination to better serve the
child's needs. States must first decide whether it better serves most children to have
a presumption in favor of or opposing relocation. Then states must carefully carve
out necessary exceptions to the presumption. A review of social science research
is helpful in evaluating the presumption.
III. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
Relocation of children following divorce has not yet been studied on a long-term
basis." Dr. Judith Wallerstein, who has done extensive research on the effect of
divorce on children, has been a powerful and persuasive voice regarding the
approach courts should take in resolving relocation cases.' Dr. Wallerstein argues
that prohibiting relocation may force that parent to choose between retaining
custody of his or her child and seeking opportunities that are tied to relocation
which may be beneficial to the child as well as the rest of the family unit.' Such
beneficial relocation opportunities might include a new marriage, job advancement,
or closer access to extended family. 7
Dr. Wallerstein posits that a parent who foregoes such a desirable relocation
opportunity in order to retain custody may suffer negative emotional consequences

The North Carolina court noted the importance of limiting unnecessary custody litigation in order to
protect children, stating:
[A] decree of custody is entitled to such stability as would end the vicious litigation so often
accompanying such contests, unless it be found that some change of circumstances has occuned
affecting the welfare of the child so as to require modification of the order. To hold otherwise
would invite constant litigation by a dissatisfied party so as to keep the involved child constantly
torn between parents and in a resulting state of turmoil and insecurity. This in itself would
destroy the paramount aim of the court, that is, that the welfare of the child be promoted and
subserved.
Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 900 (N.C. 1998).
61. See Kamer, supra note 49, at 14 (judge observes that the "more predictable (if not formulaic) the
outcome, the less likely parties will be to take their chances in a trial or hearing").
62. Children of divorce relocate more frequently than do children in intact families. See Wallerstein &
Tanke, supranote 58, at 310 (citing E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Long-Term Effects of Divorce and Remarriage
on the Adjustment of Children, 24 J. AMER. ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. 518 (1985), ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT
H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIlEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992). and JuDITH S.
WAuLERsTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN. AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER
DIVORCE 297-301 (1989)).

63. See Janet Leach Richards, The Natural ParentPreference Versus Third Parties: Expanding the
Definition of Parent,16 NOVA L REV. 733, 737 (1992) (discussing the benefits and use of the natural parent
presumption in custody conflicts between natural parents and third parties).
64. See Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 58, at 307 (suggesting that such a study would be costly and
difficult to conduct because parties would, of course, not be centrally located).
65. See id.
66. See id. cited with approvalin Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676,681 (Conn. 1998).
67. See id.
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such as depression." The parent's loss may result in negative consequences for the
child both in terms of diminished parenting and guilt felt by the child who knows
that he or she was the "cause" of the parent's lost opportunity.69
Dr. Wallerstein cites a case study involving a custodial mother who abandoned
her plans to move in order to attend medical school when the court refused to allow
the child to relocate."' The mother lacked financial resources to pursue the case and
thought that she could lessen the trauma for her child by dropping the fight.? The
mother became depressed and the child was profoundly affected, feeling responsible
for the mother's pain and disappointment. 2 Eventually, the mother went back to
court and obtained permission to relocate with the child. 3 This case illustrates that
the "custodial status quo" was clearly not obtained by simply refusing to allow the
relocation.
In deciding what is in the best interests of the child, the court should also be
cognizant of the detrimental effect a custody fight can have on the child, regardless
of its outcome. The child has already been through the trauma of a divorce and
possibly a fight over the initial determination of custody. 4 Now the child is being
threatened with another upheaval, if the court allows a full hearing and best interest
determination whenever the custodial parent seeks to relocate.
We are a mobile society. 7" Allowing a hearing in every relocation case will
subject a great number of children to potential conflict and trauma without a
demonstrated need to do so. Courts can greatly reduce the number of children that
will be subjected to relocation hearings. By relying on social science research to
identify a child-centered presumption to be applied in most relocation cases, thus
precluding a full adversarial hearing.
According to Dr. Wallerstein, social science research identifies three factors that
are associated with good outcomes for children in post-divorce families. They are:
1. A close, sensitive relationship with a psychologically intact, conscientious
custodial parent.
2. The diminution of conflict and reasonable cooperation between the parents.76

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 325.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 326.
See Judith S. Wallerstein, The Long-Term Effects of Divorce on Children: A Review, 30 J. AMER. ACAD.

CHLD & ADOLESCENT PSYCH. 349 (1991); WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 62, at 297-301.

75. Approximately one American in five changes residences each year. (How many readers of this article
have always lived in the same city?) Based on 1983 figures, a newborn will change residences about 10.5 times
during a lifetime. See Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 8, at 249 (citing Kevin E. McHugh, Book Review, 67
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 376 (1991) (discussing chapter by Robert R. Sell in LABOUR MIGRATION (James H. Johnson
& John Salt eds., 1990))). See also Anne L Spitzer, Moving and Storage of Postdivorce Children: Relocation, the
Constitution and the Courts, 1985 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1, 3 (stating that during the first four years following divorce or
separation, 75% of custodial mothers moved at least once and over half of those mothers move again).
76. See Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 58, at 311, (stating that the high potential for conflict between
parents, as in a relocation battle "can severely threaten the child's sense of security, confirming a view of the world
as an armed camp in which the child can trust no one") (citing JANET R. JOHNSTON & lUNDA E. G. CAMPELL,
IMPASSES OF DIvORCE 153, 174 (1988); Janet R. Johnston et al., Ongoing Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on

Children of Joint Custody and Sole Physical Custody Families, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 576 (1989). See also
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3. Absence of pre-existing psychological problems of the child."

Based on these findings, children are likely to benefit from a presumption in
favor of relocation in most instances. This presumption would protect the childcustodial relationship and would reduce the number of contested relocation
hearings. Such a presumption, therefore, supports two of the three factors shown to
be consistent with children's best interests.
Courts have begun to recognize the importance of custodial stability. In 1996, Dr.
Wallerstein submitted an amicus brief for the court in Burgess v. Burgess78 that
contained the results of her research and her views on the issue of relocation. 79 The
California Supreme Court in Burgess reversed its previously highly restrictive
stance on relocation and allowed the custodial parent to move, creating national
headlines.80 New York, also a restrictive state, changed its position, just weeks
earlier, in Tropea v. Tropea.8 1 Dr. Wallerstein is credited with influencing both of
these outcomes and reversing the national trend in relocation cases.82 Also in 1996,
the Tennessee Supreme Court in Aaby v. Strange3 relied on the "collective wisdom
of both the courts and child psychologists [for the proposition that] children,
especially those subjected to the trauma of divorce, need stability and continuity in
relationships most of all."' 4 Other states recognized the importance of the custodial
parent-child bond much earlier. In 1990 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed
a relocation in Gruber v. Gruber,5 after opining:
We think it is indisputable, under the circumstances of this case, that appellant's
ability to be an effective parent to her children is seriously undermined by the

James A. Twaite & Anya K. Luchow, CustodialArrangements and ParentalConflict Following Divorce: The
Impact on Children'sAdjustment, 24 J. PSYCHOL. & L 53 (1996) (level of parental conflict is a better predictor
of child adjustment than the custodial arrangement). Frank F. Furstenberg and Andrew J. Cherlin list two similar
principles for guiding social policy: 1) "The more effectively custodial parents can function, the better will be their
children's adjustment and 2) The less parental conflict children are exposed to, the better will be their adjustment."
FRANK F.FURSTENBERG & ANDREW J. CHERuN, DVIDED FA umIS: WHAT HAPPENS TO CmDREN WHEN PARENTS
PART 108 (1991).
77. Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 58, at 311, citing Marsha Kline, Jeanne M. Tschann, Janet R. Johnston,
& Judith Wallerstein, Children'sAdjustment in Joint andSole PhysicalCustody Families,25 DEv. PSYCHOL. 430,
435 (1989).
78. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
79. See id. at 476. But see Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 113 N.M. 57,62, 823 P.2d 299, 304 (1991) (recognizing
a presumption in favor of a relocating parent with sole custody but declining to recognize a presumption in favor
of the relocating parent or the resisting parent in cases involving joint legal custody, even when one parent is the
primary residential parent, and stating that "one parent's status as primary physical custodian has no particular
significance and should not entitle that parent to the benefit of [a presumption]").
80. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 480.
81. 665 N.E.2d 145, 150 (N.Y. 1996) (replacing former restrictive relocation standard, requiring a showing
of "exceptional circumstances," with a "best interests" standard).
82. Norma Levine Trusch, Relocation of Children After Divorce: The Winds of Change, 18 No.4
FAIRSHARE 2,3 (1998). See Paulson v. Bauske, 574 N.W.2d 801, 803 (N.D. 1998) ("[i]t is axiomatic that a
newlywed couple wants to live together and that the child is benefited by the satisfaction the custodial parent
derives from residing with her spouse").
83. 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996).
84. Id. at 627. See also Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1996) ("[O]ur concern must
be for the Silbaugh children and their need for a sense of stability in their familial arrangements."); JOSEPH
GOLDSTEN, ALBERT J. SOLN1T, SONJA GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD, THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST

DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATivE, 32-39 (1996) (emphasizing the child's need for continuity in relocation decisions).
85. 583 A.2d 434 (Pa. 1990).
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difficulty and unhappiness of her life in Pennsylvania. Conversely, there is no
question that the move to Illinois is likely substantially to promote the wellbeing of the mother and, consequently make her a more effective, superior
parent. We think it is fundamental that the best interests of the children cannot,
in this case, be severed from the interests of the mother with whom they live and
86
upon whose mental well-being they primarily depend.
Social science researchers have also studied the role of the noncustodial parent
from the child's perspective.87 Although father participation has been correlated to
8
children's academic performance and participation in extracurricular activities,"
surprisingly, the amount of visitation with the noncustodial parent is not consis89
tently related to the child's adjustment, post-divorce.
The quality of the relationship with the noncustodial parent, however, is very
important. Dr. Wallerstein states that "[a] child who feels abandoned by the
noncustodial parent suffers tragically, often turning the feelings back on himself or
herself as unworthy of being loved."' Children need the access and the freedom to
create a loving relationship with both parents, if at all possible under the facts of
each case. In fact, some legislatures have specifically recognized the importance of
both parents' involvement in a child's development. Nebraska's provision states:
The Legislature finds it is in the best interests of a minor child to maintain, to
the greatest extent possible, the ongoing involvement of both parents in the life
of the minor child. * * * It is the policy of this state to assure the right of
children, when it is in their best interests, to frequent and continuing contact
with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interests of the
children and to encourage parents to share in the9rights and responsibilities of
raising their children after divorce or separation.
While social science evidence supports a presumption in favor of relocation,
special emphasis on modifying visitation in order to protect and facilitate an

86. Id. at 441 (footnotes omitted). The Gruber court, in a footnote to the opinion, quoted a 1980 Illinois
appellate court for support on the link between the child's welfare and that of the custodial parent: "[Granting
[relocation] would likely benefit the child by making the custodian a happier, better adjusted parent than would
be the case if the custodian's freedom of movement was more restrained." In re Marriage of Burgham, 408 N.E.2d
37, 40 (ill. App. Ct. 1980).
87. See sources cited supra note 74.
88. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, FATHERS' INVOLVEMENT

INTHEIR CHILDREN'S SCHOOL (Sept. 1997).
89. See Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 58, at 312, citing JUDITH S. WALIERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE,
SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 238 (1989), and Furstenberg &

Cherlin. supra note 76, at 107-8 (arguing that support for the custodial parent-child relationship should take
precedence over the noncustodial parent-child relationship based on the presence of a strong link between the wellbeing of the custodial parent and the child and the absence of a similar link between visitation and the child's wellbeing). See also F. F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., Parental Participation and Children's Well-being After Marital
Dissolution, 52 Am. Soc. REV. 659-701 (1987) (noting that frequent visitation neither fostered nor hindered child's
adjustment); Steve Leben & Megan Moriarty, A Kansas Approach to Custodial ParentMove-Away Cases, 37
WASHBURN L J.497, 542 (1998) (conceding that "no precise minimum level of visitation has been found to be
either optimal or critical" but also criticizing the validity of some research methodology).
90. Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 58, at 312.
91. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2902 (Supp. 1993).
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ongoing noncustodial parent-child relationship is also necessary.' Nurturing or
even just maintaining a noncustodial parent-child relationship may be almost
impossible in some cases depending on the distance between the parties and their
resources. The degree of participation in the child's life by the noncustodial parent
will also be affected.
A model approach to relocation should recognize a presumption in favor of
relocation.93 A model approach should also carefully consider the several exceptions
necessary to protect the interests of children who may not be best served by the
presumption.
IV. EXCEPTIONS JUSTIFYING A BEST INTEREST DETERMINATION
Recognizing a presumption in favor of relocation will preclude a full hearing in
most relocation cases. While a presumption in favor of relocation is beneficial in
most cases, because of the importance of insuring custodial stability and avoiding
adversarial proceedings where possible, some presumptions go too far. For example,
in Aaby v. Strange,94 the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized a presumption in
favor of relocation, making the presumption almost conclusive.95 The court allowed
rebuttal only upon a showing of vindictive motive on the part of the custodial parent
to thwart visitation of the noncustodial parent, or in limited cases of actual harm.96
However, allowing the court to make a best interest determination only in cases
involving vindictive motive does not sufficiently protect children. Moreover, there
are several other instances in which the presumption in favor of relocation is not
necessarily consistent with the best interests of the child. In those instances,
discussed more fully below, the court should have a full hearing and make a best
interests determination.
A. FrivolousMove
A number of states require that the custodial parent have a valid reason for the
move.' "Valid" is defined as a relocation that is not primarily designed to interfere

92. See Janet M. Bowermaster, Relocation Custody Disputes Involving Domestic Violence, 46 U. KAN. L
REV. 433, 448, (1998) [hereinafter Bowermaster, Domestic Violence] ("Other prominent social science researchers
have reported findings that support [a preference for relocation]," citing ROBERT EMiERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE,
AND CHILDREN'S ADJUSTMENT 84-90 (1988); ELEANOR MACCOBY & ROBERT MNOOKIN, DVIDING THE CHmD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 295 (1992); Robert D. Hess & Kathleen A. Camara, Post-Divorce
Family Relationshipsas Mediating Factorsin the Consequences of Divorcefor Children,35 J. SOC. ISSUES 79
(1979); and Valarie King, Nonresident Father Involvement and Child Well-Being: Can DadsMake a Difference?,
15 J. FAM. ISSUES 78 (1994)).
93. See Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing with Solomon: Choosing Between Parents in a Mobile
Society, 31 J. FAM. L 791, 883 (1992-93) (recommending giving priority to the child's relationship with the
custodial parent in resolving relocation disputes).
94. 924 S.W. 2d 623 (Tenn. 1996).
95. See id. at 630. Tennessee courts were given greater discretion in hearing relocation cases by the
subsequent passage of TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108 (Supp. 1998).
96. See Aaby, 924 S.W.2d at 630.
97. See e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108 (Supp. 1998) (requiring reasonable purpose); Harder v. Harder,
524 N.W.2d 325 (Neb. 1994) (requiring legitimate reason); Garrison v. Mulcahy, 636 A.2d 732, 733 (R.I. 1993)
(requiring compelling reason).
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with noncustodial visitation.9" Relocation standards should also prohibit moves
based on a frivolous reason or no reason.
Assume that a court is presented with a situation in which the child regularly
spends every other weekend and every Wednesday night with the noncustodial
parent. Further assume that the noncustodial parent also coaches the child's soccer
team and helps with the scout troop activities. The relationship between the child
and the noncustodial parent is very close. The custodial parent decides to move
several states away, "to be nearer the ocean." Neither parent earns enough money
to pay for airfares without great hardship.
Under a rule that prohibits only vindictive moves, the court cannot weigh the
capriciousness of the desire to relocate against the disruption to the child in losing
close and intimate contact with the noncustodial parent and possibly other extended
family members.
In order to balance the competing interests of the parents and to protect the
child's interests, the court should consider both the validity of the reason for the
move and the motive regarding visitation. The noncustodial parent's visitation
rights should not be an anchor on the custodial parent. This does not mean,
however, that the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent and, more importantly,
the child's right to access to the noncustodial parent are to be disregarded in all
cases absent proof of intent to interfere with same by the custodial parent.
The American Law Institute's tentative draft on relocation endorses an inquiry
into the legitimacy of the reason for the move, requiring the relocating parent to
show "that the relocation is in good faith for a legitimate purpose and to a location
that is reasonable in light of the purpose."" If the reason is found to be legitimate,
the location should be considered reasonable unless it would be possible to avoid
moving altogether or move to a location that is substantially less disruptive." The
draft provides a list of several examples to aid the court in determining the threshold
question of the whether to move is for a legitimate purpose.'0 ' The relocating parent
bears the burden of establishing the legitimacy of a relocation for reasons not
contained in the list. 102
B. Noncustodial Parentas the PrimaryPsychologicalParent
Another exceptional situation that should be addressed in a model relocation
standard is the situation in which the noncustodial parent is the primary psychological parent even though the child lives primarily with the custodial parent. The term,

98. See Aaby, 924 S.W.2d at 628; Hayes v. Hayes, 922 P.2d 896, 899 (Alaska 1996).
99. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 2.20 (4)(a)
(Tentative Draft No. 3, Pt. L 1998).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. The nonexclusive list of legitimate reasons include:
[11o be close to significant family or other support networks, for significant health reasons, to
protect the safety of the child or another member of the child's household from a significant risk
of harm, to pursue a significant employment or educational opportunity, or to be with one's
spouse [or spouse equivalent] who is established, or who is pursuing a significant employment
or educational opportunity, in another location.
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"primary psychological parent" is used here to identify the person the child
primarily looks to for support, love, nurturing and guidance. Usually, the custodial
parent is also the primary psychological parent. That is not always the case,
however, particularly where the child "lives with a psychologically troubled parent,
or a parent who is dependent on the child in ways that burden the child's life." ' In
such instances, relocation may not be in the best interests of the child and may, in
fact, be quite detrimental."°
A default rule that favors relocation would assume that the custodial parent is
also the primary psychological parent. Where that is shown not to be the case, the
court needs the discretion to make a best interest determination in order to protect
the child's interests.
C.

SharedPhysical Custody
A model relocation standard should differentiate between the majority of cases,
involving a primary residential parent, and the increasing minority of cases,
involving shared physical custody."0 5 Presumably, in the case of equally shared
physical custody, both parents would be significant psychological parents, thus
obviating the justification for a presumption in favor of relocation based on
preserving custodial stability. Most courts have not addressed the distinction
between cases involving a primary residential parent and those involving shared
physical custody." 6 Courts that have addressed shared physical custody cases treat
them differently than cases involving a primary residential parent."°7 As more
divorcing couples opt for shared physical custody, the issue of removal involving
shared physical custody will have to be addressed by all states.
If the parents have been able to coparent successfully with shared physical
custody, they most likely have learned to put the child's interests above their own
and to reach agreement on parenting issues. In such cases, hopefully, the parents
would be able to reach an agreement regarding relocation. If not, and assuming that
both parents are actually sharing physical custody on a nearly equal basis, such that
103. Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 58, at 319.
104. See id.
105. Shared physical custody may include "joint physical custody," in which the child spends nearly equal
time in each parent's home, and "split custody," in which the child spends a majority of the year with one parent
(usually the school year) and the rest with the other parent (usually summer vacation). Other variations are possible,
such as weekdays with one parent and weekends with the other.
106. Colorado imposes a presumption in favor of relocation in sole custody cases, but the supreme court

stated in dicta that such presumption would necessarily be weakened in the case of actual joint residential custody
citing CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-131 (West Supp. 1998). See In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776,785

(Colo. 1996) (declining to address the standard that would apply in a case of actual shared physical custody).
Furthermore, the court held that § 14-10-131.5, providing for a best interest standard in deciding joint custody
modification petitions, only applied to joint legal custody. See In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776, 782 (Colo.
1996).
107. See Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 483 n.12 (Cal. 1996) (relocation in cases of joint physical
custody justifies modification under the best interests test); Ayers v. Ayers, 508 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Minn. 1993)
(relocation must be justified by the relocating parent in cases involving shared physical custody); Jaramillo v.
Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 309 (N. M. 1991) (neither party has the burden of proof where physical custody is shared).
See also Stevison v. Woods, 560 So. 2d 176, 179 (Miss. 1990) (recognizing split custody and relocating mother's
strained relation with child not in her custody as "peculiar or unusual circumstances adversely affecting the children
over and above the effect attendant upon the mere increase in miles between the children and the non-custodial
parent," thus allowing the court to modify custody, where relocation alone was not grounds for modification).
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both are de facto custodial parents," °8 the court should make a best interest
determination regarding relocation, as in an initial custody determination. Under
these circumstances, neither parent should have the burden of proof or the benefit
of a presumption.
D. Actual Dangerto the Child's Health or Welfare
Where there is proof of actual danger to the child as a result of the move, the
presumption in favor of relocation should be rebutted. The court should make a best
interest determination after a full hearing, taking into account all relevant factors.
Examples of actual danger include moving a child with a serious medical problem
to an area where no adequate treatment is readily available, moving a child with
specific educational requirements to an area with no acceptable education facilities,
or moving in order to take up residence with a person with a history of child or
domestic abuse or who is currently abusing alcohol or other substances."°9
E.

Unstable Custodial Parent
Courts may also need to make a best interest determination where the custodial
parent is mentally ill or emotionally unstable or otherwise dependent. For example,
it is possible that a parent will decide not to contest the initial custody award to the
disabled parent if the disabled parent is presently in a situation where he or she has
a sufficient support system to allow proper parenting of the child. This may occur
when the custodial parent lives with his or her parents and the noncustodial parent
is not able to serve as the primary custodial parent. Such arrangements presumably
serve the child's best interests. A very different situation is presented if that
custodial parent decides to relocate to an area where alternative support systems are
not available. In such cases, the presumption that relocation is in the child's best
interest is rebutted and the court should make a best interest determination, based
on a full hearing, specifically addressing the relocation issue.
F. InternationalRelocations
International relocations present unique jurisdictional problems in addition to the
other factors influencing the outcome of these cases. Some countries have attempted
to cooperate on custodial issues by becoming signatories to the Hague
Convention. "0 Judgments made by foreign courts pursuant to the act are entitled to
full faith and credit in American courts."' American judgments are likewise entitled

108. In joint physical custody cases, continuity and protection of the child's relationship with each parent
is paramount. See Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 58, at 318. See also Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 576 N.W.2d
476 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing trial court's decree allowing relocation where the noncustodial parent spent
one-half of the year with the child and the custodial parent did not have a necessary or legitimate reason for the
move).
109. See Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, (Tenn. 1993) (listing these examples of substantial harm in a

relocation case).
110. The Hague Convention is codified as the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42
U.S.C. § 11601 et seq. (1996).
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(g)(1996).
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to enforcement in the courts of foreign signatories.' 12 Congress also passed the
International Parental Kidnaping Crime Act of 1993,"3 making international child
14
abduction a federal felony punishable by a fine or three years in prison, or both."
If the proposed relocation is to a country that does not recognize custody orders
of this country, the child may be beyond the protection of U.S. courts and may be
subject to special risks such as being cut off from all contact with the nonrelocating
parent. Because of the special risks involved, if the relocation is to a foreign country
whose laws or public policy does not normally enforce the visitation rights of
noncustodial parents, the presumption in favor of relocation should not apply. The
presumption should not apply if the proposed relocation is to a foreign country that
does not have an adequately functioning legal system, due to war, political
upheaval, etc., or which otherwise presents a substantial risk of specific and serious
harm to the child. An example of specific and serious harm to the child would be
a proposed relocation of a female child to a country that still practices genital
to force excessive weight gain which is
excision or long stays in "fattening rooms"
5
seen as a sign of fertility and beauty."
V. "BEST INTEREST" FACTORS
If the presumption in favor of relocation has been rebutted, the court should
decide whether or not to allow relocation, based on the best interests of the child.
Several states list factors" 6 that the court should or must consider in making a best

112. The following countries are also signatories: Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Belise, BosniaHerzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region only), Croatia,
Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway. Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, St. Kitts and Nevis, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe.
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 1204.
114. The act recognizes three affirmative defenses: I) That the defendant acted pursuant to a custody order
valid under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA); 2) that the defendant was fleeing domestic
abuse; 3) that the defendant failed to return the child because of circumstances beyond the defendant's control and
that the defendant notified or tried to notify the other parent within 24 hours and returned the child as soon as
possible. See id.
115. See Ann M. Simmons, Nigerian Girls Get Fat to Reach Womanhood Ideal, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL,
Oct. 18, 1998, at A. But see Ayyash v. Ayyash, 700 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting mother's
argument that she hid the children for more than six years because she feared that the father would flee with the
children to Jordan).
116. These factors are based loosely on several standards. The D'Onofrio standard, announced by the New
Jersey superior court in D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) offers four factors
to consider. 1) The prospective advantages of the move to improve the quality of life for both the parent and child;
2) the motives of the custodial parent in seeking to relocate and the likelihood of compliance with the substitute
visitation decree; 3) the motives of the noncustodial parent in resisting the relocation; and, 4) the likelihood of
being able to fashion substitute visitation that will preserve and foster the noncustodial parent-child relationship.
These factors have been adopted by courts either specifically or generally in the following states: Arizona (Pollock
v. Pollock, 889 P.2d 633 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)); Arkansas (Staab v. Hurst, 868 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Ark. Ct. App.
1984)); Colorado (In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776,785 (Colo. 1996)); Connecticut (Ireland v. Ireland, 717
A.2d 676, 684 (Conn. 1998)); Florida (Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 417, 420 (Fla. 1993)); Illinois (In re Marriage of
Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (Ill. 1988)); Iowa (In re Marriage of Quirk-Edwards, 509 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Iowa
1993)); Massachusetts (Williams v. Pitney, 567 N.E.2d 894, 897 (Mass. 1991)); Michigan (Costantini v.
Costantini, 521 N.W.2d I (Mich. 1994) (Riley, J., concurring)); Missouri (Shaw v. Shaw, 951 S.W.2d 746,748
(Mo. CL App. 1997)); Nevada (Cook v. Cook, 898 P.2d 702, 705 (Nev. 1995)); North Dakota (Stout v. Stout, 560
N.W.2d 903,908-909 (N.D. 1997)); Pennsylvania (Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434,439 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990));
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interest determination. In relocation cases, in addition to the ordinary best interests
factors considered in initial custody determinations, the court should consider the
additional factors that are outlined below.
A.

Motives
In a model statute, proof of a vindictive or frivolous motive should overcome the
presumption in favor of relocation. The court should also consider the motives of
the parties thereafter in making a best interest determination.'" If a parent has
attempted to relocate for vindictive or frivolous motives, that parent is not likely to
foster a close relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent. Such a
finding would not automatically, however, result in a denial of permission to
relocate or a change in custody, as there are many additional factors the court
should consider. In making a best interest determination, the court could find that
relocation is in the child's best interest, despite the custodial parent's motives"' or,
if relocation is denied, that custody should, nevertheless remain unchanged."'
The motive of the noncustodial parent should also be considered"2 where there
is proof that the objection to relocation is motivated in part by a desire to control
the custodial parent.' Proof of other negative motives of the noncustodial parent
in objecting to relocation should also be considered, such as gaining a financial
advantage regarding child support obligations."
B.

Child's Preference
If one of the foregoing exceptions applies, causing the court to make a best
interests determination, the court should, in some cases, consider the child's
preference. If the child is mature, the court should give serious consideration to his
or her preference regarding relocation."n While younger children are very

South Dakota (Fortin v. Fortin, 500 N.W.2d 229, 232 (S.D. 1993)); Tennessee (Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319,
331 (Tenn. 1993)); Wyoming (Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Wyo. 1993)).
117. See, e.g., Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 684 (Conn. 1998) (requiring consideration of custodial
parent's good faith or motivation and evidence of noncustodial parent's vindictive motive and good faith in
resisting the move).
118. For instance, where there is proof of vindictive motive in addition to a legitimate motive that serves the
child's interest such as availability of special medical services.
119. For instance, where the noncustodial parent is not able to meet the child's needs on a full-time basis,
or where the relationship between the custodial parent and child is so close and nurturing that custody should
remain unchanged. In such case, the court may order the custodial parent to undergo counseling or the court may
address the visitation interference issue through its contempt powers.
120. See, e.g., In re Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (ill. 1996) (considering motives of both parents in
determining child's best interests).
121. See, e.g., Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1996); Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 684
(Conn. 1998).
122. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Soraparu, 498 N.E.2d 565,569 (111.App. Ct. 1986) (finding father's failure
to pay child support was relevant in denying his petition to modify custody); Cook v. Cook, 898 P.2d 702, 705
(Nev. 1995) (requiring court to consider the "extent, if any, the opposition is intended to secure a financial
advantage regarding ongoing support obligations or otherwise"); D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976) (noting that a factor for courts to consider in relocation cases is the "integrity of the
noncustodial parent's motives in resisting the removal and... the extent to which... opposition is intended to
secure a financial advantage in respect of continuing support obligations").
123. See, e.g., Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473,483 (Cal. 1996); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 30
(West 1998) (child over 14 must consent to relocation or the court must give permission "upon cause shown").
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dependent upon their custodial parent, the older child may be more involved with,
and dependent on friends and community outside the home."
The Supreme Court of Wyoming identified the following six factors to consider
when weighing a child's custodial preference:
1. The age of the child;
2. The reason for the preference;
3. The relative fitness of the preferred and non-preferred parent;
4. The hostility, if any, of the child to the non-preferred parent;
5. The preference of other siblings; and
6. Whether the child's preference has been tainted or influenced by one parent
against the other."
The child's preference should not be outcome determinative, but it should be given
great weight when the child is determined to be sufficiently mature to make a
circumspect choice regarding relocation. The court should also be sensitive to the
child's feelings and should avoid putting the child in the position of choosing
between the parents.
C.

Quality of Life
The court should also consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
proposed move will enhance the quality of life for the child and the custodial
parent, including the short and long term effects of the move on the custodial
parent's ability to support the child." Quality of life considerations should include
access to educational opportunities or medical services for the child.
A sufficient showing is made if the overall quality of life will improve for the
family unit on the theory that if the family unit is happier, the child will benefit
indirectly. 127 Proof of loss of quality of life by the child, as a result of the move,
should be balanced against the gain from relocation. The Supreme Court of North
Dakota recognized the importance of focusing on the interests of the custodial
family unit in Fortin v. Fortin:m
The children, after the parents' divorce or separation, belong to a different
family unit than they did when the parents lived together. The new family unit
consists only of the children and the custodial parent, and what is advantageous
to that unit as a whole.., is obviously in the best interests of the children. It is
in the context of what is best for that family unit that the precise nature and
terms of visitation and changes in visitation by the noncustodial parent must be
considered. ,29

124. See Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 58, at 322.
125. Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Wyo. 1993), citing Roberts v. Vilos, 776 P.2d 216, 219 (Wyo.
1989).
126. See, e.g., ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(J) (West Supp. 1998); Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 684
(Conn. 1998); In re Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (M. 1996).
127. See, e.g., Zalenko v. White, 701 A.2d 227, 228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) ("[W]hen the move will
significantly improve the general quality of life for the custodial parent, indirect benefits flow to the children with
whom they reside.").
128. 500 N.W.2d 229 (N.D. 1993).
129. Id. at 232 (quoting D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 29 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1976)).
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Maintenance of the noncustodial parent-child relationship is crucial, but it should
not take precedence over protection of the stability of the custodial parent-child
relationship in most instances.
D. Visitation
The court should consider the extent to which the noncustodial parent is
presently involved in the child's life, the negative effect of the move on the
noncustodial parent-child relationship,"' and the extent to which that relationship
can be fostered and preserved through modified visitation and allocation of
increased travel expenses created by relocation."' The court should also consider
the likelihood that the custodial parent will comply with the modified visitation
order after relocating, taking into account the level of cooperation demonstrated
prior to the relocation.' 32 Where cooperation in visitation was deficient or lacking
altogether, the court should consider evidence of justifiable cause related to good
faith efforts to protect the child's welfare, such as preventing visitation in the good
faith, but mistaken, belief that the noncustodial parent is inebriated. The issue in
such cases should be the good faith of the custodial parent. Good faith but
misguided efforts to protect a child do not evidence bad parenting or intent to
interfere with visitation.
E. Support Systems
The existence of extended family or other support systems, including friends, is
relevant to determining the child's best interest. 33 The court should consider both
the child's and the parent's support systems. The child's support system will
include extended family members and, as the child gets older, may include friends,
teachers, and other influential adults.
VI. STANDARD APPROACH ABSENT EXCEPTIONS
If the presumption in favor of relocation, described above, 34 is not rebutted, the
only issue for the court is modification of the visitation schedule. Every effort
should be made to preserve and foster the noncustodial parent-child relationship., 35
In revising visitation, the court should take into account developmental consider-

130. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-23 (Michie 1997) (requiring court to consider the distance
involved in the move and the hardship and expense involved in maintaining visitation).
131. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776, 785 (Colo. 1996) (noting that court may consider
whether it "is able to fashion a reasonable visitation schedule for the noncustodial parent after the move and the
extent of the non-custodial parent's involvement with the children at the old location"); Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d
676, 684 (Conn. 1998) (noting that one of the factors to consider is whether visitation is possible that will preserve
and foster the noncustodial parent-child relationship); In re Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (I. 1996) (noting the
court should consider "the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent").
132. See, e.g., Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 684 (Conn. 1998).
133. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776, 785 (Colo. 1996) (listing as a consideration, whether
there is a support system of family or friends, either at the new or old location).
134. See Part V. supra.
135. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(8A) (West 1998) (requiring court, to preserve as nearly as possible,
the existing relationship between the child and the nonrelocating parent). See also Beth M. Erickson, The
Importanceof Continuing the FatherRelationship, 8 No. 4. AM. J. FAM. L 197 (1994).
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ations and the psychological makeup of the child.'3 6 The court may consider
extending vacation and holiday visits in order for the child to maintain a meaningful
relationship with the noncustodial parent.' 37
The goal, as stated by Dr. Samuel Roll, is to make the child feel "that the loved
one is never far away and that the child is recorded in some indelible way on the
parent."'3 Dr. Roll concludes that the child is at reduced risk when the child feels
emotionally related to the noncustodial parent and has a sense of holding that parent
close. 39
The court should also consider the increased expenses associated with the
modified visitation and the relative ability of each parent to assume part of that cost.
It may be appropriate to allocate the increased travel costs to the custodial parent
or to require the custodial parent to provide transportation of the child to the
noncustodial parent's home."4 The increased costs of travel associated with the
modified visitation should also be the basis for a deviation from child support
guidelines, where appropriate to achieve equity between the parties, or when
necessary to protect the best interests of the child.
VII.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING
THE RELOCATION DECISION

A.

Burden of Proofand Presumptions
There should be a presumption that relocation is in the best interests of the child
if the primary residential parent alleges a good faith and legitimate reason for the
move. The burden should then shift to the other parent to prove one of the
exceptions outlined in part IV, in order to rebut the presumption. As the Connecticut Supreme Court explained in Ireland v. Ireland,4 a presumption in favor of
relocation is consistent with the trust placed in the custodial parent, when custody
was initially determined, that he or she would make decisions, including a
relocation decision with the best interests of the child in mind. 142
If the parent objecting to relocation proves that an exception applies, the court
should make a best interest determination regarding relocation, based on the factors
outlined in part V, without either party enjoying a presumption or having the burden
of proof.

136. See Samuel Roll, How a Child Views the Move, 20 FAM. ADVOC. Fall 1997, at 27, 31. The length of
hiatus from noncustodial parent contact that can support a viable relationship depends on the age-related
development of the child: 12-year-olds can tolerate absences of 6-9 months; 6-7-year-olds can tolerate absences
4 months or longer; 3-6-year-olds can tolerate absence of three months; 2-year-olds can tolerate absences of one
week. Id. at 30.
137. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(8A) (West 1998) (stating that modified visitation order may
include extended visitation during summer vacations and school breaks).
138. See Roll, supra note 136, at 30.
See also 10+ Easy Ways a Long-Distance Parent Can Stay in Touch, 20 FAM. ADVOC. Fall 1997, at 33.
139. See Roll, supra note 136, at 30. "Even when relocation occurs, damage to children can be minimized
through predictable contact with both parents and reduced hostilities." Id.
140. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(8A) (West 1998) (noting court may assign responsibility for
transportation to either or both parents); Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 484 (Cal. 1996).
141. 717 A.2d 676 (Conn. 1998).
142. See id. at 682.
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Separatingthe relocationissue from the custody determinationthatfollows
a court decision againstrelocation
Where relocation is the only issue before the court, the decision regarding
permission to relocate should be made independently of the custodial modification
decision that would normally follow a decision against relocation. The reason for
unlinking the decisions is to give the custodian parent the option to remain in the
jurisdiction and retain custody. The relocating parent may decide to give up the new
job, pursuit of further education, etc., rather than to lose custody of the child when
faced with that draconian choice. The court should not make the choice for the
parent by combining the decision to disallow relocation with a decision to change
custody. 43
Generally, if there was no petition to change custody pending prior to the
relocation issue arising, there should be no basis for a change of custody, assuming
the custodial parent abandons the plan to relocate. This approach is recommended,
not to protect the custodial parent's rights, but rather to protect the child's interest.
Unlinking the two issues of relocation and custodial modification preserves the
opportunity to remain with the "custodial status quo" that has already been
determined to be in the child's best interests.
B.

Guardian/Attorneyad litem
If the court is required to make a best interest determination, a Guardian ad litem
or Attorney ad litem should be appointed in order to protect the child's interests."
Ideally, both would be appointed, the guardian to fact find and to represent the
child's best interests and the attorney to serve in the full capacity of an attorney
advocating his clients' preference. If the child is sufficiently mature so that the
child's preference will be a factor in the best interest determination, it is especially
important that an attorney ad litem be appointed to insure advocacy of the child's
preference.14 If the child's preference will not be a factor in the court's determination, the court may prefer to appoint only a guardian ad litem to serve as a fact
finder for the court, rather than as an attorney for the child. If the guardian serves
only as a fact finder, there is no one to examine witnesses and otherwise advocate
on the child's behalf. Some courts attempt to combine the roles of attorney and
guardian by allowing the guardian to examine witnesses, etc. This merging of roles
C.

143. See Masters v. Masters, 630 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1994) (reversing trial court's order to change custody
to father solely on the basis of mother's notice of intention to relocate where mother later asserted that move was
not imminent).
144. The ABA-approved Juvenile Justice Standards Relating to Counsel for Private Parties specify mandatory

appointment of an attorney for the child "who is the subject of proceedings affecting his or her status or custody."
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES § 2.3(b) (1979). The 1996
Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children recommended that a lawyer appointed to
represent a child in a legal proceeding should serve as the child's lawyer, if possible, regardless of the tide of the
appointment. See Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues inthe Legal Representation of Children,
64 FORDHAm L REv. 1301 (1996).
145. Typically, the attorney ad litem serves as an advocate for the child, advancing the child's preference.
while the guardian ad litem is "the representative of the child's best interest" Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 68889 (Conn. 1998).
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can lead to conflicts, particularly where the guardian's view of the child's best
interests do not coincide with the mature child's wishes.
If a guardian ad litem is appointed, his or her report and opinion should be
presented through testimony subject to cross-examination," unless both parents
waive their rights to do so. Such waiver should ordinarily be obtained at the time
of the appointment because the disfavored parent may later refuse to allow a
hearsay report that contains adverse statements.
Costs associated with the appointment of a guardian ad litem or attorney ad litem
should be allocated among the parties by the court. The court should, however,
allocate the fee of the guardian ad litem or attorney ad litem, and ascertain that it
has been paid prior to issuing a ruling. Otherwise, the dissatisfied parent may refuse
to pay. The court should appoint a guardian ad litem or attorney ad litem on a pro
bono basis if the parents are indigent. Acceptance of a certain number of pro bono
cases can be a prerequisite to membership on the court's approved list of guardians
or attorneys ad litem.
D.

Mediation
Legislatures and courts should take affirmative steps to avoid having to make
relocation decisions for the parties by requiring mediation as a prerequisite to a
contested court hearing. 47 If the parents can be encouraged and admonished to put
the child's interests first, in those cases in which the parents do truly love their child
and want to protect that child's best interest, a solution can usually be reached
which does meet the child's needs.'"
An adversarial hearing is not designed to facilitate such a solution. Mediation,
however, with specially trained mediators, may have much better success in guiding
the parties to reach a compromise agreement that they can live with and which truly
reflects the best interests of the child. A resolution is most likely where the parties
are dealing in good faith.149
The goal of court-ordered mediation is to reach the parents before they have
become entrenched in their adversarial positions. As one Tennessee legislator put
it, the idea is "to get to the parties before they get their guns loaded." Mediation is
designed to encourage parents to work out a post-relocation visitation plan that
maintains the child's emotional growth, health, stability and physical care and
which allows the child to maintain a close parental relationship with each parent.
There is wide disagreement over the viability of mediation in cases involving
domestic abuse. Special provisions should provide for mediation in abuse cases only
when the victim consents, when the mediator is trained in mediating in abuse cases

146. See, e.g., Ireland, 717 A.2d at 688.

147. Montana provides for court-ordered alternative dispute resolution, except in abuse cases, for
nonrelocation custody disputes. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 40-4-219 (Supp. 1998). See also Levine v. Bacon, 705
A.2d 1204, 1206 (N.J. 1998) (suggesting that courts refer relocation disputes to mediation).
148. See Sandra Morgan Little, A Move in the Right Direction, 20 FAM. ADvoc. Fall 1997, at 32.
149. See Hanley M. Gurwin, Settling RelocationIssues Through Alternative Dispute Resolution, 20 FAM.
ADVOC. Fall 1997, at 24. (1997) (encouraging the use of mediation and arbitration in relocation disputes).
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regarding the safety of the victim, and when the victim is allowed to have a support
person present.'50
E. Private Ordering
At the time of the divorce, parties may seek to negotiate an agreement either
allowing, prohibiting, or restricting relocation. 5 ' However, nonrelocation
52
agreements should not be enforceable. If such agreements were enforceable, the
parent who was willing to be a noncustodial parent as long as the custodial parent
agreed not to relocate would have a powerful bargaining chip assuming the quid pro
quo for the relocation prohibition was acquiescence on the residential custody issue.
One scholar stated that permission to relocate was being used as a bargaining chip
with
in Florida to get lower child support payments or to avoid alimony obligations,
5
spouse."'
first
the
by
controlled
is
family
second
"the
that
result
the
If the private ordering issue is viewed from the parents' perspective, the noncustodial parent could argue that the agreement represents a fair exchange. The
custodial parent could claim that the agreement was obtained under duress and
through bad faith bargaining.
If the private ordering issue is viewed from the child's perspective, it is
simplified. Social science research, reviewed in part II, substantiates the
importance of stability in the custodial arrangement. That part also addresses the
adverse consequences that may affect the child if the custodial parent is frustrated
in his or her relocation plans. The custodial parent's frustration would surely be
exacerbated if the nonrelocation agreement was not the result of a freely entered
into bargained-for-exchange. Finally, the parties should not be able to bind the court
regarding the court's continuing oversight of the child's best interests during the
child's minority. At the very least, the nonrelocation agreement should be subject
to a best interest analysis at the time of its enforcement.
Cases Involving Domestic Abuse or Substance Abuse
Victims of domestic abuse are most at risk when they attempt or threaten to
escape from the control of their perpetrator." Relocation can trigger this same
F.

150. Tennessee has a statute containing these protective provisions. See 6A TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6107(Supp. 1998).
151. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 35-38. See also Sample Relocation Clauses, 20 FAM.
ADVOC. Fall 1997, at 44.
152. Arizona allows private ordering by the parties on this issue. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408() (West
Supp. 1998) provides as follows:
The court shall not deviate from a provision of any parenting plan or other written agreement
by which the parents specifically have agreed to allow or prohibit relocation of the child unless
the court finds that the provision is no longer in the child's best interests. There is a rebuttable
presumption that a provision from any parenting plan or other written agreement is in the child's
best interests.
Id. See also Williams v. Pitney, 567 N.E.2d 894, 898 (Mass. 1991) (Parents' separation agreement, which
conditioned removal upon consent of the noncustodial parent, was subject to the statutory provision allowing
removal by permission of the court "upon good cause shown.").
153. See Divorced ParentsFindinga Move Can Alter Custody, COMMERCIAL APPEAI, February 5,1989,
at Al, quoting University of Florida law professor, Anne Spitzer.
154. See Joan Zorza, Recognizingand Protectingthe PrivacyAnd ConfidentialityNeeds of BatteredWomen,
29 FAM. LQ. 273, 274 (1995).
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danger for the custodial parent who was a victim of domestic abuse, even when the
abuse seems to have subsided after the divorce. In cases where the abuse is ongoing,
the victim may seek to relocate to avoid the abuse. Some states have recognized the
problems and dangers associated with relocation involving abuse and have,
therefore, adopted protective provisions.' Others states have not. In those states
that do not have protective provisions, results have varied, including awarding
custody to the abusive parent, 5 6 a finding of contempt of court,'57 and a holding
specifically limiting protection for the abused parent to the specific facts of the
case,158 when the custodial parent fled with the children.
One scholar in the area of domestic abuse argues that violent men use custody
and visitation as the "continuing arena for their domination and control" of former
spouses.1 9 Under such circumstances, restrictive relocation standards facilitate the
continuing abuse which, in turn, negatively impacts the child.
The Model Code on Domestic Violence addresses the issue of abused parents in
custody cases and takes the position that the safety of the victims should take
priority over visitation rights of the abuser."so One way to protect the victims would
be to establish a procedure to allow the parent to relocate without notifying the
abuser.
Custodial parents, who are victims of abuse, should be allowed to present a
relocation request to the court, ex parte. The request should be accompanied by an
affidavit stating the history of abuse and the custodial parent's grave concern that
relocation will trigger more violence, or that violence will continue if the parent
does not relocate. The court should require corroboration of such allegations,

155. See e.g., AiA. CODE § 30-3-132(b) (Cum. Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(3)(C) (Supp. 1998);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(9)(C) (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1620 (Supp. 1998); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 452.377 (West 1998); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051(G)(1) (Anderson 1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 105.007 (West 1996). In 1994, the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence of the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges provided for a presumption against custody with the violent parent where the
court determines that domestic violence has occurred (sec. 401). The Model Code also calls upon the court to
consider as primary the safety and well-being of the child and the abused parent in setting visitation and provides
that parental absence and relocation of the abused parent cannot be weighed against that parent (sec. 402). See also
International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of 1993, 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (West Supp. 1998) (which makes fleeing
an incident or pattern of domestic violence a complete defense to international kidnapping).
156. The custodial decision was, however, reversed on appeal and custody was awarded to the abused parent
who was also the primary caretaker. See Marshall v. Marshall, 690 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
157. See e.g., Olmo v. Olmo, 528 N.Y.S.2d 880,881 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (lower court's finding of
contempt reversed on appeal). See also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125A.350 (Michie 1993) (stating that relocation
without written consent of other parent or permission of court may be considered by the court if the noncustodial
parent seeks a change of custody).
158. See Desmond v. Desmond, 509 N.Y.S.2d 979,983 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1986) (Although holding that
mother's removal in order to flee abuse would not be weighed against her in the instant case, the court stated that
its decision "must, under no circumstances, be construed as giving a general license to parents to flee the
jurisdiction with their children simply because there is some history of marital abuse."). In North Dakota, a parent
who intentionally removes a child with the intent to deny the other parent's rights under a custody decree is guilty
of a class C felony. Detaining a child out of state for more than seventy-two hours is prima facie evidence of such
intent. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-22.1 (1997).
159. Bowennaster, Domestic Violence, supra note 92, at 449-50 (recounting a case in which the custodial
parent seeks a divorce after a violent episode of physical, sexual, and verbal abuse, but was not allowed to relocate
until two-and-a-half years later, suffering severe abuse, loss of employment, constant fear, helplessness, bankruptcy
and destitution in the interim).
160. See MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENcE § 401-403 (Advisory Committee of the Conrad
N. Hilton Foundation, Model Code Project Family Violence Project 1994).
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barring exigent circumstances. If the court finds a reasonable basis for the custodial
parent's fear of domestic violence from the noncustodial parent upon learning of the
relocation, the court may allow the custodial parent temporarily to relocate. 161 The
court should first obtain information that the move is not likely to be detrimental to
the child. The court should also obtain the relocating address, phone number and
employer, as well as the name and address of the child's school. As soon as possible
after the custodial parent relocates, the noncustodial parent should be notified of the
relocation, but not provided with identifying information concerning the location.
The noncustodial parent should then be given an opportunity for a full hearing if he
or she objects to the relocation or a limited hearing for the purpose of determining
visitation.' The court may determine that the noncustodial parent must undergo
counseling or evaluation prior to allowing unsupervised visitation, depending on the
proof in the case. The paramount concern of the court in these cases must be the
child's safety, including protection against parental kidnapping.
Alcohol or other drug abuse by the noncustodial parent raises similar issues as
domestic abuse and thus can also create special risks in the event of a relocation.
The custodial parent should be allowed to approach the court ex parte for
permission to relocate temporarily without first notifying the noncustodial parent,
if the custodial parent presents sufficient allegations of danger to the parent or child.
Following the relocation, the noncustodial parent should be notified and afforded
a full hearing on the relocation or visitation issues. The court should take into
account social science studies which indicate that children suffer emotional harm
visitation is ordered where domestic violence or high conflict is
when frequent
63
present.
G. New terminology
This article has used conventional terms such as custodial parent and noncustodial parent. These terms may connote a "winner" and a "loser," a "good"
parent and a "bad" parent, a "real parent" and a "mere visitor." A model statute,
however, should use less adversarial terms that recognize the important role that
each parent plays after the divorce, in continuing to parent the child. Some
examples include "nonresidential parent," instead of "noncustodial parent";
"residential parent," instead of "custodial parent"; "parenting time," instead of
"visitation"; These terms are used in the model statute set out in Part IX.
VIII. OTHER MODELS
Several learned bodies have considered or are in the process of considering the
question of relocation. The model relocation statute proposed in this Article was not

161. See e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(C) (1997) (allowing the court to require the custodial parent to give
bond or other security conditioned upon the return of the child to North Carolina in accordance with the order of
the court).
162. See e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051(G)(1) (Anderson 1996) (allowing court to withhold copy
of notice of relocation from parent convicted of abuse).
163. See Bowermaster. Domestic Violence, supra note 92, at 447. citing Janet Johnson et al., Ongoing
Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint Custody and Frequent Access, 59 AM. J. ORTHoPSYCH. 576
(1989).
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created from whole cloth. The approaches of other model acts, outlined below, were
carefully considered and, in varying degrees, incorporated into the proposed model
relocation statute contained in this Article.
A.

Uniform Marriageand Divorce Act
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, promulgated in 1970, does not directly
address the issue of relocation." In that act, relocation falls under the more general
section on custodial modification." That section prohibits motions to modify prior
custody awards within two years, absent court permission based on affidavits
alleging endangerment to the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health." s
Two years after the entry of a custody decree, one party may seek a modification
by showing such changed circumstances of the child or custodial parent that a
modification of custody is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. 67 Such
a showing must be based upon facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that
were unknown to the court at that time."c Even if the court finds sufficient proof of
changed circumstances to hear the motion, custody will not be changed unless the
court also finds one of the following three requirements:
1. That the custodial parent agreed to the modification;
2. That the child has been integrated into the noncustodial parent's home with
the custodial parent's consent; or
3. That the child's present environment endangers the child's physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health and that the advantages of custodial modification
outweigh the possible harm caused by such change."

The first issue for courts that adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act was
whether relocation, alone, was sufficient evidence of changed circumstances to
justify a hearing on a motion to modify custody. Some courts held that relocation
was a sufficient change of circumstances to grant jurisdiction to the trial court to
consider a motion to change custody, 7 ° but that relocation by itself does not

164. See UNiF. MARRIAGE AND DIvoRcE Acr § 101 et seq., 9 and 9A U.LA 159-688 and 1-549 (1973).
States that have adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act include: Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25311 to 25-330,25-401 to 25-411 (1998); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-113 (1974); Illinois,
ILL COMiP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750 para. 51101 to 5/802 (West 1977); Kentucky, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.010 to
403.350 (Michie 1984); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.002 to 518.66 (1998); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 452.300 to 452.416 (West 1997); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1-101 to 40-1-104,40-4-101 40-4-226
(1997); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.002 to 26.09.914 (1997).
165. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIvORCE Acr § 409(b), 9A U.LA. 439 (1973).
166. See id. at § 409(a).
167. See id. at § 409(b).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See, e.g., Rice v. Shepard, 877 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. App. (1994); Pfeiffer v. Pfeiffer, 364 N.W.2d 866
(Minn. App. 1985) (relocation constituted a change of circumstances for purpose of hearing a motion to modify
custody).
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constitute grounds sufficient to enable the noncustodial parent to obtain a change
of custody."' Other states passed legislation specific to the issue of relocation.'
The Act, however, contains no clear standards regarding the proof required to
meet the endangerment standard. In fact, case law suggests that the courts were
applying a best interest standard rather than the higher endangerment standard
contained in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. For example, the Illinois
Supreme Court denied permission to relocate where the custodial parent failed to
show that the new job would include higher wages, or that the move would improve
the asthmatic condition of a son from a prior marriage, and where the custodial
parent had not cooperated regarding visitation.73 The Montana Supreme Court
found that the statutory requirements for changing custody were met where the
move within the state would hinder the effectiveness of the existing custodial
arrangement. 7 4 The Missouri court of appeals changed custody of two children,
ages 12 and 14, when the custodial parent moved to take another job and the
children preferred to remain with the noncustodial parent, where they had
developed relationships with friends and relatives and where they were active in
community and school-related events.' As these decisions indicate, more specific
standards were needed to guide the parties and the courts and to ensure greater
consistency and predictability.
The American Academy of MatrimonialLawyer's Model Relocation Act
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyer's (AAML)Model Relocation
Act' 76 is not intended to be a uniform act. Furthermore, it does not promote a
particular resolution of the relocation conundrum. The proposed Act is designed,
instead, to serve as a template, offering alternative language on significant issues
77
such as the burden of proof and whether relocation triggers a full custody inquiry.
It requires all parties entitled to residential custody or visitation, to give written
notice sixty days prior to relocating.' The notice must contain a proposed
visitation schedule if the move would make the current visitation schedule
unworkable.7 Relocation is permitted by default if the noncustodial parent does not
object within thirty days after receiving notice.' Notice is not required in cases
involving domestic violence.'' If the noncustodial parent files an objection to
B.

171. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lichtenstein, 487 N.E.2d 1293 (M. App. 1986); In re Marriage of Johnson,
777 P.2d 305 (Mont. 1989) (MONT. CODE. ANN. § 40-4-219 (1997) currently provides that relocation which
significantly affects contact with the other parent is grounds for modification.).
172. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(H) (West Supp. 1998); 750 IL- COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602,609
(West 1998).
173. See In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041 (111.1988).
174. See In re Marriage of Syverson, 931 P.2d 691 (Mont. 1997).
175. See Becker v. Becker, 745 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. App. 1987).
176. See PROPOSED MODEL RELOCATION Ac § 101 et seq. (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
1997). Copies of this Act are available from the AAML office: American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, 150
North Michigan venue, Suite 2040, Chicago, Illinois 60601, phone: 312-263-6477.
177. See id.
178. See id. at § 203.
179. See id.
180. See id. at § 301.
181. See id at § 205. The domestic violence exception is patterned after similar provisions in the Uniform
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relocation, the act requires a hearing and permits the court to allow or prohibit
removal on a temporary basis pending the final outcome of the hearing.' 2 The court
must consider certain factors.. 3 in making its determination:
1. The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration of relationship of the
child with each parent;
2. The age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the
relocation will have on the child's physical, educational, and emotional
development;
3. The feasibility of preserving the child's relationship with the non-custodial
parent;
4. The child's preference, considering age and maturity level;
5. Whether there is an established pattern of the person seeking relocation either
to promote or thwart the child's relation with the other parent;
6. Whether the relocation of the child will enhance the general quality of life for
both the party seeking the relocation and the child, including but not limited to
financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity;
7. The reasons each person seeks or opposes relocation; and
8. Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child.'"
The issue of assigning the burden of proof is left open. The act proposes three
alternatives:
1. That the relocating person bears the burden of proving that the relocation is
made in good faith and is in the best interest of the child; or
2. That the nonrelocating person bears the burden of proving that the objection
is made in good faith and that relocation is not in the best interest of the child;
or
3. That the relocating person initially has the burden of proving that the
proposed relocation is made in good faith, and, if that burden is met, the burden
shifts to the nonrelocating person to show that the proposed relocation is not in
the best interest of the child.'
The AAML proposed Act is helpful in that it carefully sets out a number of
relocation issues with a selection of alternatives for the states to consider. Its
shortcoming is that it does not take a position on the approach that states should
adopt, an approach that best protects the child's interests.
C.

The American Law Institute Tentative Draft
The American Law Institute is currently considering the issue of relocation." 6
The tentative draft is similar to The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyer's

Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) § 312.
182. See PROPOSED MODEL RELOCATION ACT § 302, 401 (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
1997).
183. See id. at § 405. These factors were recently adopted by the Delaware Family Court in Stephanie v.
Steven, Nos. CN97-06107, 9706262, 9706263, 1997 WL 906044, at *3-4 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997).
184. See PROPOSED MODEL RELOCATION ACT § 405 (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1997).
185. Id. at § 407.
186. See PRiNcIPESOF THE LAW OF FAMILY DIsOLUIoN, Principles Governing the Allocation of Custodial
and Decisionmaking Responsibility for Children § 2.20 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1998).
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Model Relocation Act in that it requires notice of intent to relocate and a proposed
revised visitation schedule. 18 7 The ALI draft differs significantly from the AAML
model in that the ALI draft takes a definitive position on the proper outcome of
controversial issues related to relocation, rather than simply offering alternatives as
is the case with the AAML model.' 88 The ALI draft adopts a presumption in favor
of relocation, subject to some limitations discussed below." 9
The ALI draft differs from the AAML model in a number of other areas as well.
First, failure to comply with the notice provision without good cause' 9° may be
considered in determining whether the move is in good faith and can be the basis
for an award of attorney's fees and expenses.' 9'
Second, a relocation that does not significantly interfere with either parent's
currently exercised parental responsibilities does not constitute a substantial change
9
in circumstances justifying the court's consideration of a custodial modification."
When changed circumstances are shown, the court should try to revise the parenting
plan to accommodate the relocation and retain the same proportional allocation of
custodial responsibilities currently being exercised.' 93
If proportional allocation of custodial responsibilities cannot be maintained, the
court should modify the parenting plan based on the best interests of the child, as
defined in the act,'94 and also based on four principles:
1. There is a presumption in favor of relocation for the parent exercising a
significant majority 95 of the custodial responsibility if the decision is made in
good faith for a legitimate purpose"' and to a location that is reasonable'" in
light of the purpose.' 9
2. If the requirements of "I" are met, except that neither parent is currently
exercising a significant majority of custodial responsibility, the court should

187. See id.
188. See id
189. See § 2.20, cmt. a.
190. See id. Good cause includes failure to give notice in an emergency flight from domestic abuse. See
§ 2.03(8) Domestic abuse is defined as "the infliction of physical injury, or the creation of a reasonable fear thereof,
... against the child or another member of the household." Id Good cause may also be based on other circumstances

of the case. In all events, the relocating parent should seek permission from the court before violating the notice
provision or as soon thereafter as is practical. See § 2.20, cmt. c.
191. See § 2.20(2).
192. See § 2.20(1).
193. See § 2.20(3).
194. See §§ 2.09 and 2.10.
195. The "proportion of custodial responsibility that constitutes a significant majority" should be defined
and applied uniformly in the state. See § 2.20(4)(a).
196. "Legitimate purpose" includes moving "to be close to significant family or other support networks, for
significant health reasons, to protect the safety of the child or another member of the child's household from
significant risk of harm, to pursue a significant employment or educational opportunity, or to join one's spouse [or
spouse equivalent, if defined] who is established, or who is pursuing a significant employment or educational
opportunity in another location. The relocating parent has the burden of proving the legitimacy of any other
purpose." § 2.20(4)(a).
197. A relocation is reasonable unless the legitimate purpose for relocating can be "substantially achievable
without moving, or by moving to a location that is substantially less disruptive of the other parent's relationship

with the child." § 2.20(4)(a).
198. See § 2.20(4)(a).
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apply a best interest test' 99 without a presumption favoring relocation and should
consider all relevant factors, including the effects of relocation on the child."
3. If a parent cannot establish good faith, legitimate purpose, and reasonable
location, the court may modify the parenting plan based on the best interests of
the child and the effects of relocation on the child. The court may order a
change of custody if and when relocation occurs, but such contingency should
not be considered if the relocating parent shows that relocation would be in the
best interests of the child"'

4. The court should attempt to minimize harm to the nonrelocating parent-child

relationship through alternate arrangements for the exercise of custodial
responsibility appropriate to the parents' resources and circumstances and the
child's needs.'

The ALI draft focuses the court's attention on the actual custodial arrangement,
rather than what has been ordered, when assessing the proposed relocation. If the
noncustodial parent is not currently exercising visitation rights but wants to assert
them to prevent relocation, the court may find there is no substantial change of
circumstance to justify review of the custodial arrangement. 3
If, on the other hand, the noncustodial parent's lack of participation is due to
interference by the custodial parent, the court would find a substantial change of
circumstances and should reassess the allocation of custodial responsibility,
applying the third principle listed above. '°
The ALI draft fails to address several issues, including 1) the situation in which
the primary psychological parent is not the primary residential parent, 2) other proof
of harm to the child resulting from the relocation, 3) the effect of domestic violence,
and 4) international relocations. These additional issues are addressed in the
proposed model relocation act that follows.

199. The best interest test is based on factors set out in §§ 2.09-2.10.
Section 2.09 states that court ordered custody arrangements should approximate the prelitigation
allocation experienced by the parties, except where a change is made to achieve one of the following objectives:
to permit the child to have a relationship with the other parent, including minimum visitation allowed by state law;
to accommodate the child's preference when authorized by state law; to keep siblings together, to protect the child's
welfare by taking into account the child's emotional attachment to one parent or by considering one parent's ability
or availability to meet the child's needs; to consider the parents' agreement; to avoid an allocation that would be
extremely impractical or would substantially interfere with the child's need for stability.
Section 2.10 provides that the court should also consider the level of each parent's participation in past
decisionmaking on behalf of the child, the parent's wishes, the demonstrated ability and cooperation in prior
decisionmaking, any parental agreements, and the existence of limiting factors as found in § 2.13, such as domestic
abuse or drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse.
200. See § 2.20(4)(b).
201. See § 2.20(4)(c).
202. See § 2.20(4)(d).
203. See § 2.20, cmt. a., illus. 1. The draft does not seem to distinguish between objecting to removal and
seeking modification of parenting responsibilities because of the relocation. A parent who has failed to exercise
parental responsibilities prior to relocation, but who is "waked up" by the proposed relocation and wants to petition
the court to revise the parenting plan to preserve that parent's opportunity to exercise parental responsibilities
should be able to do so because of the importance to the child of maintaining a healthy relationship with both
parents where possible.
204. See § 2.20, cmt. a., illus. 4., applying § 2.20(4)(c).
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IX.

RECOMMENDATION

Goals
A model statute should incorporate all the recommendations set forth in the
preceding sections of this Article. The model statute should be designed to
accomplish, at least, the following goals:

A.

(1) Protecting the stability of the custodial parent-child relationship in all its
forms;
(2) Discouraging litigation in the vast number of cases;
(3) Identifying those infrequent, but serious instances in which the best
interests of the child require that the court be afforded discretion to change
custody if necessary;
(4) Allowing a less adversarial venue for negotiating a modified visitation
schedule that will preserve the noncustodial parent-child relationship;
(5) Separating the relocation issue from the custody determination that
follows a court decision against relocation;
(6) Making every effort to foster and maintain the relationship between the
noncustodial parent and the child.
The proposed model relocation statute that follows attempts to incorporate all of the
goals stated above. The statute draws heavily upon the work of other model statutes
discussed above, particularly the ALI tentative draft, and attempts to expand, and,
hopefully, even to improve on them.
t s
B. ProposedModel Relocation Statute"
Section 101.
A. If a parent who is spending intervals of time with a child desires to relocate
with the child outside the state or more than one hundred (100) miles from the
nonrelocating parent within the state, the relocating parent shall, unless excused
by the court under § 102, send a notice to the nonrelocating parent at the
nonrelocating parent's last known address by registered or certified mail. Unless
excused by the court for exigent circumstances, the notice shall be mailed not
later than sixty (60) days prior to the move. The notice shall contain the
following:
(1) Statement of intent to move;
(2) Location of proposed new residence;
(3) Reasons for proposed relocation; and
(4) Statement that the nonrelocating parent may file a petition either to
oppose the relocation of the child or only to modify the allocation of parental
responsibilities, within thirty (30) days of receipt of the notice.
B. If a parent desires to relocate without the child outside the state or more
than one hundred (100) miles from the other parent within the state, the

205. The proposed model relocation statute incorporates much of the relocation statute just passed by the
Tennessee General Assembly. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108 (Supp. 1998). The author was a member of the
Tennessee Bar Association Family Law Code Revision Commission that drafted the initial version of this statute
for submission to the legislature.
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relocating parent shall send a notice to the other parent at the other parent's last
known address by registered or certified mail. Unless excused by the court for
exigent circumstances, the notice shall be mailed not later than sixty (60) days
prior to the move.
The notice shall contain the following:
(1) Statement of intent to move; and
(2) Location of proposed new residence.
C. If the nonrelocating parent does not object to the child's relocation and the
parents can agree on a new parenting plan, the relocating parent should file the
new plan with the court prior to relocating.
D. If the nonrelocating parent does not file an objection to the relocation or to
the revised parenting plan within thirty days after service of notice of the
relocation, the relocating parent may move without further court action.
E. If the nonrelocating parent does not object to the relocation of the child, but
the parents cannot agree on a new parenting plan, the relocating parent shall file
a petition seeking to alter the parenting plan. The court shall alter the parenting
plan in anticipation of the relocation with the goal of allowing the child to
relocate and also fostering and continuing the child's relationship with and
access to the nonrelocating parent. If possible, the court should try to retain the
same ratio of time that the child currently spends with each parent. The court
shall assess the costs of transporting the child and determine whether a deviation
from the child support guidelines should be considered in light of all factors
including, but not limited to, additional costs incurred for transporting the child.
F. If one parent is the primary residential parent and that parent proposes to
relocate with the child, the nonrelocating parent may, within thirty (30) days of
receipt of the notice, file a petition in opposition to removal of the child. The
parent spending the greater amount of time with the child shall be permitted to
relocate with the child unless the court finds sufficient proof of any of the
following grounds to rebut the presumption in favor of relocation:
(1) The relocation does not have a reasonable purpose; or
(2) The relocation would pose a threat of specific and serious harm, as
defined in the next subsection, to the child which outweighs the threat of harm
to the child of a change in designation of the primary residential parent.
(3) The parent's primary motive for relocating with the child is vindictive
in that it is intended to defeat or deter rights of the parent spending less time with
the child.
Prior agreements between the parties or prior decrees of the court restricting or
prohibiting relocation are not enforceable and are not to be considered in
determining whether the presumption in favor of relocation has been rebutted.
G. Specific and serious harm to the child shall include, but is not limited to,
the following:
1. If a parent wishes to take a child with a serious medical problem to an
area where no adequate treatment is readily available;
2. If a parent wishes to take a child with specific educational requirements
to an area with no acceptable education facilities;
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3. If a parent wishes to relocate and take up residence with a person with
a history of child or domestic abuse or who is currently abusing alcohol or other
drugs;
4. If the child relies on the parent not relocating who provides emotional
support, nurturing and development such that removal would result in severe
emotional detriment to the child;
5. If the primary residential parent is emotionally disturbed or dependent
such that he or she is not capable of adequately parenting the child in the absence
of support systems currently in place in this state, and such support system is not
available at the proposed relocation site; or
6. If the proposed relocation is to a foreign country whose public policy
does not normally enforce the rights of non-primary residential parents, which
does not have an adequately functioning legal system or which otherwise
presents a substantial risk of specific and serious harm to the child.
H. If the court finds sufficient proof of one (1) or more of the grounds
designated in subsection F, the presumption in favor of relocation is rebutted and
the court shall determine whether or not to permit relocation of the child based
on the best interest of the child. The court shall make specific findings of fact in
support of its holding and shall consider all relevant factors including those set
forth in subsection J.
I. If the parents are actually spending substantially equal intervals of time with
the child and the relocating parent seeks to move with the child, the
nonrelocating parent may, within thirty (30) days of receipt of notice, file a
petition in opposition to removal of the child. No presumption in favor of or
against the request to relocate with the child shall arise. The court shall
determine whether or not to permit relocation of the child based upon the best
interests of the child. The court shall make specific findings of fact in support of
its holding and shall consider all relevant factors including those set forth in
subsection J.
J. In making a best interest determination, the court shall make specific findings
of fact in support of its decision and shall consider all relevant factors including
the following when applicable:
1. The prospective advantage of the move for improving the general quality
of life for the child directly or indirectly;
2. The extent to which parental rights and responsibilities have been
allowed and exercised by the nonrelocating parent;
3. Whether the relocation will allow a realistic opportunity for intervals of
time with each parent;
4. The extent to which allowing or prohibiting relocation will affect the
emotional, physical or developmental needs of the child;
5. Whether the primary residential parent, once out of the jurisdiction, is
likely to comply with any revised parenting plan;
6. The love, affection, and emotional ties existing between the parents and
child;
7. The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care, education and other necessary care and the degree
to which a parent has been the primary caregiver;
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8. The importance of continuity in the child's life and the length of time the
child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment;
9. The stability of the family unit of the parents;
10. The mental and physical health of the parents;
11. The home, school and community record of the child;
12. The reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or
older. The court may hear the preference of a younger child upon request. The
preferences of older children should normally be given greater weight than those
of younger children;
13. Evidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other
parent or to any other person;
14. The character and behavior of any other person who resides in or
frequents the home of a parent and such person's interactions with the child; and
15. The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage
a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other
parent;
16. The gender of the parent who seeks to relocate for the reason of
career, educational, professional, or job opportunities, or otherwise, shall not be
a factor in favor or against the relocation of such parent with the child;
17. Prior agreements between the parties or prior decrees of the court
restricting or prohibiting relocation are not enforceable and are not to be
considered in deciding whether relocation is in the best interests of the child.
K. If the court finds it is not in the best interests of the child to relocate as
defined herein, the court shall modify the parenting plan, subject to the condition
of the relocating parent actually relocating without the child. In doing so, the
court will decide what residential arrangements are best for the child taking into
account the relocation. The court can decide to designate the nonrelocating
parent the primary residential parent or the court may order a more equal sharing
of residential responsibilities based on the best interest of the child. The court
shall make specific findings of fact in support of its holding and shall consider
all relevant factors including the following where applicable:
(1) The court shall consider the availability of alternative arrangements
to foster and continue the child's relationship with and access to the relocating
parent.
(2) The court shall make a new determination of child support obligations
among the parents.
(3) The court shall assess and allocate the costs of transporting the child
for and determine whether a deviation from the child support guidelines should
be considered in light of all factors including, but not limited to, additional costs
incurred for transporting the child.
Section 102.
A. Notice to the other parent may be waived upon application to the court
before relocating or as soon thereafter as is practical, if the move is under
emergency conditions to protect the safety of the relocating parent, child, or other
household member. The court may waive notice to the other parent upon a
showing of domestic abuse, child abuse, substance abuse or other exceptional
circumstances where the court makes a finding that the health or safety of any
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adult or child would be unreasonably placed at risk by the disclosure of the
required identifying information concerning a proposed relocation of the child.
The specific residence address and telephone number of the child, parent or
person, and other identifying information shall not be disclosed in the pleadings,
notice, other documents filed in the proceeding or the final order except for an
in camera disclosure. The court may take any other remedial action necessary to
facilitate the legitimate needs of the parties and the best interest of the child.
B. If notice is waived, the court will hold a hearing as soon as practical after
the relocation in order to give the nonrelocating parent an opportunity to be heard
regarding the other provisions of this section. The court may withhold information regarding the new residence, but should consider allowing phone or other
contact with the child if determined to be in the child's best interest, pending the
final outcome of the hearing.
C. An order permitting temporary relocation of a minor child may require the
relocating parent to give bond or other security conditioned upon the return of
the child to this State in accordance with future orders of the court.
Section 103.
A. Prior to scheduling any contested hearing as required in Section 101, the
court should consider the advisability of ordering the parties to undergo
mediation.
B. If an order of protection was previously issued involving the parties, or if
there is a court finding of domestic abuse or any criminal conviction involving
domestic abuse during the parties' marriage or earlier relationship, the court may
order mediation only if:
(1) Mediation is agreed to by the victim of the alleged domestic or family
violence;
(2) Mediation is provided by a certified mediator who is trained in
domestic and family violence in a specialized manner that protects the safety of
the victim; and
(3) The victim is permitted to have in attendance at mediation a
supporting person of the victim's choice, including, but not limited to, an
attorney or advocate. No victim may provide monetary compensation to a nonattorney advocate for attendance at mediation.
C. Illustrations
One way to test the success of a model statute is to apply it to hypothetical facts
and ask whether the goals of the statute are met as applied to those facts. Assume
that the primary custodial parent wanted to relocate for a frivolous reason. If the
nonrelocating parent objected to the relocation and the court found that the reason
was frivolous, the presumption in favor of relocation would not apply and the court
would make a best interest determination. If the nonrelocating parent was an
involved, caring, fit, attentive parent who already spent a great deal of time with the
child, the court might find that the move was not in the child's best interest and
might change the child's primary residential parent to the nonrelocating parent,
conditioned on the actual relocation of the relocating parent. If the relocating parent
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decides not to relocate in light of this ruling, the parenting plan stays just as it was
and the conditional decree is moot.
Assume the same scenario as above, except that the nonrelocating parent is not
a fit person to serve as the primary residential parent. The finding of a frivolous
motive for the move will overcome the presumption in favor of relocation and the
court will have to make a best interest determination, as before. The court may find,
however, that relocation is in the best interests of the child, even though the reason
for the move is frivolous, because of the detriment to the child of disrupting the
existing residential arrangement.' The court will, however, modify the current
parenting plan to ensure ongoing contact with the nonrelocating parent with the goal
of retaining the same proportion of time with each parent after the relocation as
actually existed before the relocation.
The preference for relocation will discourage contests in the vast number of cases
in which the best interests of the child are served by allowing relocation and
denying an opportunity for litigation that is likely to be traumatic for the child and
expensive for the parties. Categories are listed to allow the preference to be rebutted
where it cannot be assumed that the move will be consistent with the child's best
interest.
In those cases where relocation is not allowed and in those where it is, the court
is bound to modify the parenting plan with a goal of maintaining and fostering the
child's relationship with both parents. Conditioning the court's decree on actual
relocation, where the court finds relocation not to be in the child's best interest,
affords the relocating parent an opportunity to choose not to move and to maintain
the status quo, which presumably would be better for the child than the modified
parenting plan because it would promote stability.
Finally, the model encourages a less adversarial approach to relocation through
the use of parent-friendly terminology, mediation, and special protections for abuse
situations. Every effort should be made to allow and assist the parents to reach an
agreement that reflects their love for and understanding of their child rather than
defaulting to a court-ordered parenting plan.
X. CONCLUSION
Relocation cases are among the most difficult decisions a court must make. The
approach advocated in this Article is based on protecting the child's interests rather
than parental rights. Protection of children can best be accomplished by limiting the
number of children subjected to a full adversarial hearing where relocation is
consistent with the child's best interest and by allowing a full hearing in the other
cases after requiring the parties to mediate in an attempt to minimize the acrimony
between the parties and the accompanying trauma for the child. When relocation is
decided by the court, the relocation decision should be separated from the custody
determination that follows a court decision against relocation. When relocation is
allowed, every effort should be made to foster and maintain the relationship

206. See Kerkvliet v. Kerkvliet, 480 N.W.2d 823, 829 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)(denying motion to change
custody on the basis that "although [custodial parent's] reasons for her proposed move are feeble and insensitive,

the fact remains that she is an excellent primary caregiver to the children").
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between the noncustodial parent and the child. The paramount interest of the court
in relocation cases must be the child. The model relocation statute attempts to keep
the child's interest paramount.

